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Abstract 
This dissertation comprises three papers that study how transportation cost affect price 
distribution across a city, how home equity affects the timing of pension withdrawal, and potential 
implications of macroprudential policies on the price informativeness.  Specifically, the first paper 
examines how a change in the cost of car ownership affects housing price gradient with respect to 
distance from the central business district (CBD) in Singapore. The second paper investigates how 
household home equity affect the timing of claiming Social Security Retirement Income (SSRI) in the 
United States.  The third paper explores how countercyclical policies in Singapore real estate market 
affect price informativeness.  
Chapter 2 studies one important factor that helps to explain the price distribution of housing 
throughout a city.  It is the acquisition cost of transportation.  One key finding is obtained.  When the 
cost of owning a car increases, the price of housing closer to the city center increases relative to housing 
farther away from the CBD, suggesting that increases in the price of a car cause individuals to increase 
their willingness to pay to locate closer to the CBD.  This is consistent with the predictions from the 
monocentric city model that allows for two modes of transportation. 
Chapter 3 examines the question that help to explain the timing when elderly individuals decide 
to receive SSRI benefits.  The question investigates the trade-off between Social Security Retirement 
Income (SSRI) and home equity, two largest components among the various sources of financial assets 
of the elderly.  Three key findings are obtained.  An increase in the value of a home causes elderly 
individuals to delay SSRI claiming once they are eligible during the housing boom period, but we do not 
find a statistically significant impact on the claim decision during the bust period.  Second, higher 
housing values have a positive effect on the likelihood of retirement in both the boom and bust period.  
Third, pension eligibility plays a role on the impact of home equity on retirement.  
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Chapter 4 address one question that helps us to understand the consequences of macroprudential 
policies.  It asks how the countercyclical policies that are designed to deter speculators by increasing 
transaction cost affect price informativenss in real estate market.  Two key findings are obtained.  First, 
speculative trade decreases after dramatic increase in the transaction cost.  Second, price trend along 
sales sequence shows significant increasing pattern.  It suggests that price might not accurately reflect 
the true value of houses without market players who play a role in promoting informational efficiency.
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The price distribution of housing throughout a city has been of interest to urban economists since 
the advent of the monocentric city model (Alonso, 1964; Muth, 1969; Mills, 1967; Wheaton, 1974; 
Brueckner, 1987).   While transportation costs include acquisition costs, operating costs and time costs 
(Coulson and Engle, 1987), previous literature have mainly focused on the operating cost and time costs, 
probably because the car ownership rate in the U.S. is high and usage costs are generally larger than the 
acquisition costs (Ferdous et al, 2010).  In contrast, in jurisdictions where the government institutes 
traffic control policies, such as Shanghai and Singapore, the per-capita car ownership rate is low and the 
cost of acquiring a car is substantially larger than the usage costs (Chu, 2014; 2015).  This implies that 
the acquisition cost of car ownership may affect the housing price gradient through its impact on the 
demand for a car versus other types of transportation.  A better understanding of this question would be 
important for policy makers as well as academics.  
Another important question in the real estate economics is related to the aging population.  Many 
countries are moving into aging societies (e.g. the United States, China).  For instance, the proportion of 
individuals over the age of 65 in the U.S. rose from 8% in 1950 to 13% in 2010 and is expected to rise to 
over 20% by 2030 (Lee, 2014).  The rapid increase in the share of the elderly population raises concerns 
regarding the financial readiness of the retirement system for a dramatic increase in individuals filing for 
Social Security.  Among the various sources of financial assets of the elderly, Social Security 
Retirement Income (SSRI) and home equity are the two largest components of an elderly household’s 
balance sheet.  Elderly individuals who need additional wealth and are at the eligible age to receive 
Social Security can choose to start receiving SSRI.  However, if these individuals start receiving SSRI as 
soon as they become eligible, the monthly benefit is lower than if the individual delayed a few years 
Therefore, it would important to see if elderly individuals are more likely to start receiving SSRI later 
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when house prices increase.   
The third important question in the real estate economics concerns the impact of macroprudential 
polices on the market efficiency.  The idea of market efficiency has been applied extensively to 
theoretical models and empirical studies of financial securities prices since Samuelson (1965), Fama 
(1965; 1970) and Ross (1976), but it has been less explored in the real estate market.  While 
macroprudential policies are widely used globally after the recent housing and financial crisis 
(Ceruttia, Claessens and Laeven, 2017), our knowledge of the unintended consequences are still limited 
(Claessens 2015; Crowe, Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Rabanal, 2013; Hanson, Kashyap and Stein, 2011). 
Possible findings might have important policy implications.  
This dissertation first helps to explain the price distribution of housing throughout a city by 
utilizing a unique traffic control policy in Singapore, then addresses the trade-off between SSRI and 
home equity for the elderly in the U.S., followed by the potential impact of countercyclical policies on 
price informativeness in Singapore real estate market. 
Chapter 2 examines an important prediction from the monocentric city model by utilizing a 
unique institutional feature in Singapore of the car registration process.  As one of the most classic 
models in urban economics, monocentric city model states that transportation cost is one relevant factor 
that affects the price distribution of housing throughout a city (Alonso, 1964; Muth, 1969; Mills, 1967; 
Wheaton, 1974; Brueckner, 1987).   While most papers have focused on the usage cost of transportation, 
we focus on the acquisition cost.  The identification is achieved by using the vehicle quota allocated by 
the government as the instrument variable for the cost of car ownership. 
We find, as expected, that as the acquisition cost of car ownership increases, the price of housing 
closer to the city center increases relative to the housing farther away from the city center, consistent 
with the predictions from the monocentric city model with both public transportation and private 
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transportation.  Policy makers need to be cognizant of the unintended consequences that traffic control 
policies, such as restricting the number of car registrations, have on residential house prices.    
Chapter 3 investigates the extent to which elderly households make decisions on financing 
retirement using SSRI and housing equity.  The majority of the existing literature has focused primarily 
on the relationship between local labor market shocks and the decision to withdraw SSRI, with any 
discussion of home equity being a secondary consideration (Coile and Levine, 2007, 2011a, 2011b; 
Goda, Shoven and Slavov, 2011).  Another strand of literature focusing on the role of home equity has 
examined how changes in house prices affect the decision to retire and leave the labor market (Disney, 
Ratcliffe, and Smith, 2015; Farnham and Sevak, 2007; Ondrich and Falevich, 2016; Zhao and Burge, 
2017a; Zhao and Burge, 2017b).  We expand upon this literature by directly drawing a link between how 
elderly individuals make the decision to start receiving SSRI benefits versus using their home equity to 
finance expenditures.  The identification is achieved by drawing upon geographic variation in the land 
supply elasticity of an MSA, developed by Saiz (2010), as the topological characteristics of an area are 
not likely to be correlated with local demand shocks to the economy.  We interact this supply elasticity 
measure with the change in the national house price index and use this interaction term as an instrument 
for the change in local house prices.   
We find that larger increases in house prices are associated with delayed SSRI claiming during 
the boom period from 2002-2006.  During the bust period from 2007-2009, we do not find a statistically 
significant effect on SSRI claiming. Furthermore, we see that when house values increase, individuals 
are more likely to retire, and that SSRI eligibility also play a role when considering the impact of home 
equity on the retirement decision.  Our findings suggest that the elderly seems to treat home equity and 
SSRI as substitutes when financing retirement.  It appears that most of this trade-off is during boom 
periods, but not when house prices decline, consistent with cashing-out home equity as a viable option 
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only when house price appreciates.  Our findings are important for policy makers in designing relevant 
policies after having a better understanding of the substitutability between these two assets. 
  Chapter 4 explores the potential impact of unexpected macroprudential policies that are 
designed to deter speculators on the price informativeness in Singapore real estate market.   The idea of 
market efficiency has been applied extensively to theoretical models and empirical studies of financial 
securities prices since Samuelson (1965), Fama (1965; 1970) and Ross (1976).  There have been debates 
on whether speculator contribute to the market efficiency.  Market could be inefficient with short-term 
speculation (Brunnermeier, 2005; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1992), or speculative trade is conducive 
to market efficiency (Brown and Yang, 2016; Chang, Luo, and Ren, 2014; Cornell and Dietrich, 1978; 
Jaffe and Winkler, 1976), or the effect of speculators on the market efficiency depends on traders' 
characteristics (Figlewski, 1978; Tirole, 1982).   
While macroprudential policies are more widely used globally after the recent housing and 
financial crisis (Ceruttia, Claessens and Laeven, 2017), our knowledge of the unintended consequences 
are still limited (Claessens 2015; Crowe, Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Rabanal, 2013; Hanson, Kashyap and 
Stein, 2011).  This chapter utilizes a unique feature of Singapore housing market that most transactions 
happen before the consumption feature is ready and the uncompleted property market attracts investors 
(Fu and Qian, 2014; Fu, Qian, and Yeung 2015).  Another feature of Singapore housing market is that 
all units within each residential project in Singapore are very homogeneous before households move in 
(Baltagi and Li, 2015).  This means that, after adjusting for observed characteristics, we have essentially 
identical units transacted at near time.   We are interested in how short-term investment behavior in this 
segment of market affects the price informativeness. 
This is achieved by examining the housing price of very similar units over sales sequence using 
unexpected macroprudential policies as transaction cost shocks to short term speculators.  We find that 
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short-term speculative transactions decreased dramatically after policies and the price over sales 
sequence shows significant upward trend after dramatic increase in transaction cost for short term 
traders.  Our results suggest that transaction tax can deter speculators, and price might not accurately 
reflect the true value of houses without market players who play a role in promoting informational 
efficiency. 
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Chapter 2 The Impact of the Cost of Car Ownership on the Housing Price Gradient in Singapore 
(Coauthored with Jing Li and Amanda Ross) 
2.1 Introduction 
The price distribution of housing throughout a city has been of interest to urban economists since 
the advent of the monocentric city model (Alonso, 1964; Muth, 1969; Mills, 1967; Wheaton, 1974; 
Brueckner, 1987).  The monocentric city model argues that there are different factors that affect the 
price of housing relative to distance from the city center.  For example, as transportation costs increase, 
individuals will be willing to pay more to locate closer to the central business district (CBD) so that they 
do not have to travel as far to work.1  However, estimating the effect of transportation costs on the urban 
price gradient is problematic, as the costs are likely correlated with various unobserved factors that 
contribute to the house price gradient.  To address endogeneity concerns, we examine the urban house 
price gradient in Singapore, as the unique nature of the car registration process allows us to obtain 
supply-driven, exogenous variation in the price of car ownership to identify a causal relationship. 
 The city-country of Singapore offers a unique opportunity to study the urban price gradient due 
to a key feature of its transportation policy aimed at reducing road congestion.  To own a car in   
Singapore, like most countries, you must obtain a registration, known as a Certificate of Entitlement 
(COE).2  However, unlike most countries, the government restricts the number of COEs available to 
curb growth of the number of cars and hence to reduce traffic.  To distribute the limited number of 
COEs, the government allocates the registrations through a competitive on-line bidding process. 3  
Therefore, the price of a COE, which is a significant portion of the price of acquiring a car in Singapore, 
                                            
1 Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport (2008) found that the poor tend to live in cities due to reliance on public transportation, 
consistent with predictions from this model. 
2 Singapore also engages in congestion pricing practices. However, since we are not studying congestion specifically in this 
paper, we do not discuss the details of this policy. For more information on congestion pricing, see Verhoef (2002), Saleh 
(2007), Larsen, Pilegaard, and Van Ommeren (2008), Eliasson et al. (2009), and De Lara et al. (2013). 
3 We discuss the auction process in detail later in the paper. 
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varies over time based on the number of registrations available each auction. The high cost of obtaining 
a COE is one of the primary reasons that car ownership rates are so low in Singapore (Chu, 2014; 2015).  
 We estimate the extent to which house prices throughout Singapore vary with respect to distance 
from the CBD as transportation costs, specifically the price of a car, change. 4   To obtain causal 
estimates, we use the number of COEs released by the Land Transport Authority as an exogenous, 
supply-driven instrument for the price of a car.  The number of COEs released each auction is based on 
the government’s desire to reduce congestion and is unlikely to be affected by the future change in 
house prices throughout the city.  Therefore, we use the number of COEs released each quarter as an 
instrument for the price of a COE and hence the price of a car.  Our first stage regressions support the 
use of the number of COEs as an instrument for the price of a COE. 
 Using the number of COEs allocated in a given quarter as our instrument, we examine how the 
price of housing varies with respect to distance from the city center as the price of a COE, and hence the 
price of a car, changes.  To do so, we obtained proprietary information on residential property sales in 
Singapore from 2002Q2 to 2015Q4. To control for house-specific characteristics other than distance to 
the city center, we exploit a homogeneity feature of Singapore’s private residential market to include 
“unit” specific fixed effects. This is a viable option because all units within each residential project are 
homogenous, with the same interior design, the same furnishings, the same major electrics, and the same 
outdoor facilities. In this context we have high-frequency transaction records for almost identical units 
in the property sales market (Baltagi and Li, 2015).  This feature of the Singaporean private housing 
market enables us to frequently trace the change in house prices at various distances from the CBD 
while including “unit” (project) fixed effects.  
                                            
4 Glaeser and Kahn (2004) argue that the declining cost of a car in the U.S. is one of the main reasons why American cities 
have become so sprawled. This suggests that the price of a car is important when considering transportation costs. 
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 We find that higher COE premiums are associated with higher house prices for units that are 
closer to the CBD.  Specifically, we find that if the COE premium increases from $10,000 to $40,000, 
which is how much the premium increased between 2009 and 2010, the price of centrally located 
housing increases by approximately 8.37%. At the same time, we find that this increase in house prices 
declines with distance from the CBD. For those units that are 10 kilometers away from the city center, 
the same increase in the COE premium is associated with only a 2.19% increase in house prices. In other 
words, the percent increase in the price of housing for units 10 kilometers from the CBD is 
approximately four times less than the price increase of centrally located housing units.  This result 
supports the predictions of the monocentric city model, allowing for alternative modes of transportation 
(i.e. private or public transportation).  Our findings are consistent across various specifications, such as 
using different time trends as controls, using different definitions of the CBD, restricting the sample to 
only those units that are sufficiently far from a subway stop that residents are more likely to rely on cars 
for transportation, and to including different types of COE registrations. 
 Our results are consistent with the literature on the “negative rent gradient,” which has been 
discussed extensively in the urban economics literature.5 To estimate the effect of transportation costs on 
house prices at various distances from the CBD, prior studies have mainly considered time costs and 
gasoline prices.  For instance, Coulson and Engle (1987) and Blake (2016) found that increases in gas 
prices increased the price of centrally located houses.  Anas and Chu (1984) reported that the probability 
of living in a given neighborhood is decreasing in average travel time and travel cost to the city center. 
Cortright (2008) showed that house prices fell more in ZIP codes with longer commutes after an 
increase in gas prices. Molloy and Shan (2010) found that an increase in gasoline prices led to a 
decrease in new home construction in locations with longer commutes, but found no significant effect on 
existing house prices.  Accounting for both monetary and time costs, Tse and Chan (2003) found 
                                            
5 Arnott and MacKinnon (1978) also examined these price gradients, allowing for congestion. 
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evidence of a negative rent gradient using data from Hong Kong, versus the other studies mentioned 
which focused on the U.S. 
 We contribute to this literature by examining the effect of a change in the acquisition costs of car 
ownership on the house price gradient.  In the U.S., the car ownership rate is high and usage costs, both 
monetary and non-monetary, are generally larger than the acquisition costs (Ferdous et al, 2010).  
However, in jurisdictions where the government institutes traffic control policies, such as Shanghai and 
Singapore, the per-capita car ownership rate is low (12 cars per 100 people in Singapore) and the cost of 
acquiring a car is substantially larger than the usage costs (Chu, 2014; 2015).  This implies that the 
acquisition cost of car ownership may affect the housing price gradient through its impact on the 
demand for a car versus other types of transportation. We expand upon the literature by examining how 
changes in the acquisition costs of a car affect the price of housing at various locations throughout the 
city using a model with two modes of transportation. Furthermore, our identification strategy is novel 
within the urban price gradient literature as we use an exogenous change in the supply of car 
registrations, which is unlikely to be correlated with other demand factors influencing the house price 
gradient, as an instrument for the price of a car.  While the use of such supply side instruments is 
becoming increasingly popular in the economics literature, we are the first to utilize this type of 
instrumental variables approach to estimate the urban price gradient.6  
 The rest of the paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional details of 
vehicle ownership and the housing market in Singapore. Our theoretical model is presented in Section 3. 
Section 4 outlines our identification strategy and we discuss our data in Section 5. Section 6 describes 
our main results and we show a series of robustness checks in Section 7. We conclude in Section 8.  
                                            
6 These supply-side instruments have become increasing popular since Saiz (2010) created estimates of the elasticity of 
supply for MSAs in the U.S. These elasticity estimates have been used in the literature to address demand-related 
endogeneity issues, including Mian and Sufi (2011, 2013) and Cvijanović (2014) who use this measure to explain variation in 
house price appreciation across MSAs.  
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2.2 Vehicle Ownership and Residential Property Market in Singapore  
2.2.1 Vehicle Ownership in Singapore  
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)’s report in 2016, Singapore retained the title 
of the most expensive city in the world for the third consecutive year, and the price of owning a car is 
one of the factors that make the city-country so expensive.  The Singaporean government has 
implemented several policies to reduce traffic and congestion, specifically congestion pricing 7  and 
vehicle ownership restraint.  As a result of these policies, the costs of owning a vehicle in Singapore are 
extremely high and subsequently the car ownership rate is low (Chu, 2014; 2015).  
 To curb the growth of the vehicular population, a vehicle quota system was introduced by the 
Singaporean government in May 1990 via the Certificate of Entitlement (COE) scheme. Vehicle owners 
must obtain a COE to purchase a car, but there are a limited number of these registrations available.  
Therefore, obtaining a COE is conditional on making a successful bid when buying a car.  A COE is 
valid for ten years and individuals have the option to renew at the end of the term but will have to pay a 
significantly higher road tax premium and obtain a new COE at the current market price.8 COEs are 
distributed via five categories of vehicles, and households primarily obtain COEs for their personal cars 
from categories A and B, but sometimes through category E as this is an open category.9   
 The number of COEs available, known as the COE quota, is determined by the Singaporean 
government based on three components: the number of vehicles de-registered, the allowable growth rate 
                                            
7 While congestion pricing is in effect in Singapore, we do not discuss it in detail as it is not the focus of our analysis. For 
more information, see Agarwal, Koo, and Sing (2015) and http://www.lta.gov.sg/content/ltaweb/en/roads-and-
motoring/managing-traffic-and-congestion/electronic-road-pricing-erp.html. 
8 When the COE for a vehicle is about to expire, the owner can renew it by paying a Prevailing Quota Premium (PQP). There 
are two options for COE Renewal: (1) revalidate the COE for another 10-year period by paying the PQP; (2) revalidate their 
COE for another 5-year period by paying half the PQP.  For motorcycles and cars, there is no limit to how many times you 
can renew the COE so long as the COE is renewed for 10 years. However, there will be road tax surcharge applied for 
vehicles over 10 years old. Details can be found at https://www.lta.gov.sg/content/ltaweb/en/roads-and-motoring/owning-a-
vehicle/costs-of-owning-a-vehicle/tax-structure-for-cars.html.  
9 Category A refers to cars up to 1,600cc and maximum power output not exceeding 97kW, Category B refers to cars above 
1,600cc or maximum power output above 97kW, Category C refers to goods vehicles and buses, Category D refers to 
motorcycles, and Category E can be used for any type of vehicle. 
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as determined by the government, and adjustments to account for changes in the vehicle population.10 
The auction for a COE is held through an online, open-bid process and has been conducted over a three 
day period, twice a month since April 2002. The number of successful bidders is limited by the number 
of COEs available in each category in that auction. The price of the COE is increased over the bidding 
period until the number of bids is less than or equal to the quota for that auction. All successful bidders 
in the vehicle category pay the same premium, the minimum amount needed to have a successful bid in 
that auction, regardless of the bid made.11   
 Kochhan et al. (2014) estimate that the total cost, net of the resale value, of a new mid-range car 
over a seven-year operation period in Singapore is 150,001 Singapore Dollars (SGD) (see Table A2 for 
the details of this example), with an acquisition cost of 122,144 SGD, an operating costs of 61,530 SGD, 
and a resale value of 33,673 SGD.12 In the case that Kochhan et al. (2014) discuss, the COE premium 
was 63,630 SGD, which was the average 2012 COE bidding results, and accounted for 52.1% of the 
acquisition cost and 34.6% of the combined acquisition and operating costs. Note that the total operating 
costs over a seven-year period for a mid-range car is estimated to be less than the price of a COE. This 
further highlights the importance of considering the impact of the acquisition costs of a personal vehicle 
in jurisdictions where the government institutes traffic control policies. 
2.2.2 Residential Property Market in Singapore  
Residential properties in Singapore are grouped into three categories: private non-landed 
properties (including private apartments and condominiums), private landed properties, and public 
housing, locally known as Housing and Development Board (HDB) flats.  Private landed properties are 
                                            
10 For specific details on the allowable growth rate set, see https://www.mot.gov.sg/About-MOT/Land-
Transport/Motoring/Vehicle-Ownership/.  
11 For more information on the auction process, see http://www.lta.gov.sg/content/ltaweb/en/roads-and-motoring/owning-a-
vehicle/vehicle-quota-system/certificate-of-entitlement-coe.html. For an example of the bid process, see Appendix Table A1.  
12 Acquisition costs include open market value (OMV), customs duty, goods and services tax, a registration fee, an additional 
registration fee (ARF), a carbon emission-based vehicle scheme (CEVS), the COE price, and the retailer margin. 
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those properties where the owner owns the title to the land. Private non-landed properties are leased 
from the government through either a 99-year lease or a 999-year lease.  HDB flats are low-income 
properties that are heavily subsidized by the Singaporean government.  
For our analysis, we restrict our sample to the private non-landed residential market.  We make 
this restriction for several reasons.  First, private residential housing is likely to be affected by any 
market force that impacts the price of housing, unlike HDB flats which are heavily subsidized by the 
government. While HDB flats make up the largest portion of the overall housing market in Singapore, 
approximately 85% of Singaporeans live in HDB flats according to the 2012/13 General Households 
Expenditure Survey (HES),13 we exclude these units due to the high subsidy received when purchasing a 
HDB unit as well as other policies that restrict the demand and supply of these properties.14   
In addition, compared to other market segments, private non-landed housing units are very 
homogenous within each residential project.  This provides an opportunity to explore price variation of 
hedonically adjusted units that are essentially the "same."  In Singapore, it is uncommon to find 
repeatedly transacted units that would allow us to explore price variation of the same unit over time 
(Jiang, Phillips, and Yu, 2015).15 As such, it is important to match hedonic characteristics to track price 
changes of matched units over time. Private non-landed housing units within the same housing project 
are very homogenous in terms of the attributes of the units (Baltagi and Li, 2015).16  This feature allows 
us to track the price change of almost identical units in the same project.  
2.3 Theoretical Model 
                                            
13 The HES collects detailed information on the expenditures of households in Singapore. HES 2012/13 was the tenth in the 
series conducted by the Singapore Department of Statistics from October 2012 to September 2013.  
14  For more information on the policies and the nature of the subsidy for HDB housing flats in Singapore, see: 
https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Public-Housing-in-Singapore.pdf  
15 This is especially true for landed private properties. These units make up a very small portion of the market, less than 5%, 
and are not frequently transacted. Given that we do not have many repeat sales of comparable properties for this segment of 
the market, we exclude the landed market from our analysis. 
16 Guntermann, Liu, and Nowak (2016) also argue that nearby properties are likely to have similar attributes in the U.S. and a 
nearest neighbor model can be used to increase the number of observations in a repeat sales model. 
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Consider first the standard downward sloping bid-rent function from the monocentric city model, 
as shown in Figure 2.1.  Many factors may cause this bid-rent function to shift, including a change in the 
cost of purchasing a car.  If the cost of acquiring a car changes, there will be a parallel shift in the bid-
rent function due to the change in the fixed costs of car ownership.  For example, suppose that the 
purchase price of a car decreases, then this would cause a parallel shift outwards as indicated by the 
arrow in Figure 2.1. 
However, the model in Figure 2.1 assumes cars are the only means of transportation.  In many 
cases, like in Singapore, alternative modes of transportation (i.e. the subway or bus) are popular options.  
Therefore, individuals who live the closest to the city center, where the subway system is the most 
extensive, do not need a car and will be willing to pay more for housing.  Those individuals farther from 
the CBD, where public transportation is not as extensive and amenities are not as nearby, may not be 
willing to spend as much on housing because they are more likely to need to purchase a car for daily 
transportation.17  Therefore, when there are two modes of transportation we will have two bid-rent 
functions, as shown in Figure 2.2, and the price of housing at various distances from the CBD will be 
determined by the outer envelope of the two bid-rents. 
Now, suppose that we see the same decrease in the price of acquiring a car that shifts the bid-rent 
function for private transportation outwards.  In this situation, we see that there will be a change in the 
portion of individuals who rely on public versus private transportation.  Specifically, those individuals 
who live at a distance between X1 and X2 from the city center will switch from using public 
transportation to car ownership.  Given this change in the mode of transportation used by some 
                                            
17 Independent of the intention to drive to work, which in the standard assumption of the monocentric city model, individuals 
may also use cars for other types of trips, such as shopping or taking the kids to school. This will also affect the willingness 
to pay for a car at various points in the city. As transportation is needed to access amenities, a car may make these other 
errands easier especially in more distant areas where amenities are more likely to be scattered. 
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residents, we have a new outer envelope of the bid-rent function and hence will observe a change in both 
the level and slope of the observed house prices throughout the city. 
2.4 Identification Strategy 
We estimate how changes in the price of a car, driven by variation in the cost of a COE, affect 
the price of housing.  Furthermore, we consider how this effect varies based on the distance of the 
housing project from the CBD to estimate the house price gradient.  To do so, we start with the 
following specification:  
    (1) 
where the dependent variable, , is the median area-adjusted house price in housing project  in 
quarter .   is the average COE premium in quarter .  We focus on COEs in categories A and B 
to calculate  based on the quarterly COE premium weighted by the quarterly COE quota in each 
category.18    represents the distance (in kilometers) between project  and the city center, which we 
define as the Raffles Place MRT station.19  We also include the price index for the national non-landed 
private housing market, , to control for the national trend in house prices.20 Individual project fixed 
effects, , are included to control for project-specific characteristics that could affect the price of 
housing, including the amenities in the unit as well as the distance to the city center.  We include 
different time trend controls across specifications, such as a yearly time trend, year-by-quarter fixed 
effects, and a planning-area specific linear time trend.21  
                                            
18 Categories A and B are the primary categories for personal vehicles. As a robustness check, we include Category E which 
can be used for any type of vehicle. 
19 The Raffles Place MRT stop is considered the CBD in Singapore because it is directly beneath the center of the financial 
district . As a robustness check, we use the City Hall MRT stop as the city center, which is considered the closest to the 
political center of Singapore. 
20 For more information on the creation of house price indices, see Bailey, Muth, and Nourse (1963) and Case and Shiller 
(1987, 1988). 
21 There are 55 urban planning areas in Singapore, spanning five regions. Each planning area has a population of about 
150,000 people and is served by a town center and several neighborhood commercial/shopping centers. More details can be 
found at http://www.ura.gov.sg/uramaps/?config=config_preopen.xml&preopen=Planning Boundaries&pbIndex=1. 
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If we estimate equation (1) using OLS,  captures the overall price response of residential 
properties with respect to changes in the price of the COE (also known as the COE premium).   
captures the house price response with respect to changes in the COE premium relative to a given 
project’s distance from the CBD.  This coefficient is an estimate of the urban price gradient, where the 
effect of the COE premium on house prices varies based on how far the unit is from the CBD. 
 However, there may be reverse causality present which would cause OLS estimates to be biased.  
For example, it is likely that housing farther away from the CBD and cars are complementary goods, as 
individuals with farther commutes are more likely to rely on personal vehicles for transportation.22  
Therefore, if the price of housing farther from the CBD increases due to an unobserved local shock, then 
this would decrease the demand for personal vehicles and drive down COE premiums. Since both of 
these effects are expected to have a negative relationship, our estimated average effect will be 
somewhere in between these two slopes, which suggests that we could have an upward or downward 
bias, depending on which effect is stronger.23   
To address this concern and obtain causal effects, we instrument for the COE premium using the 
number of COEs available (also known as the COE quota), announced by the Land Transport Authority.  
The COE quota measures the supply of COEs in a given quarter, which is likely to be correlated with the 
price of the COE.  However, the COEs are allocated by the government based on concerns about 
                                            
22 Based on data released by the Department of Statistics in Singapore, the proportion of resident working persons aged 15 
years and over using a car to commute to work is the lowest in CBD area. This proportion generally increases as the distance 
to CBD increases, except for three spikes in car usage rate in areas concentrated with high income residents living in private 
condos and landed properties.  For more information, see https://www.singstat.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-
library/publications/publications_and_papers/cop2010/census_2010_release3/cop2010sr3.pdf 
23 Specifically, we argue that housing prices for units farther away from the CBD can be negatively explained by COE 
premiums, , where . However, due to potential reverse causality issues, the following causation 
may also exist: , where . In identifying the first equation, we may suffer from an omitted variable 
bias where the sign of the bias depends on . Note that . We have 
, where  if  and  if . That is, the estimated 
coefficient of -a will be biased upwards (less negative) if the slope of the key equation is steeper and is biased downwards 
(more negative) if the slope of the key equation is flatter. 
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congestion and traffic in Singapore from past statistics, not expected house price appreciation 
throughout the city-country.24  Therefore, we believe that the COE quota is a valid instrument for the 
COE premium. 
 To show that the price of the COE and the COE quota are correlated, in Figure 2.3 we plot the 
relationship between the COE premium and quota for vehicles in categories A, B, and E.  As we see in 
this figure, these variables are highly negatively correlated, suggesting that as the number of COEs 
available increases, the COE premium decreases. We therefore can use the COE quota ( ) as an 
instrument for the COE premium ( ), where we will use  and  to instrument 
for  and  in equation (1). 
2.5 Data 
To conduct our analysis, we rely on three datasets. The first dataset is transaction-level price data 
for all private residential transactions in Singapore from the Real Estate Information System (REALIS) 
maintained by the Urban Redevelopment Authority of Singapore (URA). 25  The REALIS database 
provides proprietary information on the universe of all residential property sales since January 1, 1995.26  
The data contains information on the transaction date, transaction price, unit attributes (project identity, 
building block, floor level, and living area), and project attributes (project size, location by postal 
district, completion date, and land title). 
                                            
24 One possible concern may be that traffic is a disamentiy, and since traffic tends to be concentrated in the CBD in many 
cities there may be a problem with our instrument.  However, unlike most American and European cities, the Singaporean 
government is cognizant of traffic related issues and has implemented various policies to curb traffic congestion.  The COE 
quota system and congestion pricing have been especially effective in ensuring good traffic conditions in Singapore.  For 
more information on what has been done by the government in Singapore to curb congestion, see 
https://www.lta.gov.sg/content/ltaweb/en/roads-and-motoring/managing-traffic-and-congestion.html. 
25 https://spring.ura.gov.sg/lad/ore/login/index.cfm 
26 Sales are logged with the Singapore Land Authority (SLA) by the purchasers’ lawyers shortly after the property is sold. 
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 We aggregate the house price data to the project-quarter level. To do so, we compute the median 
floor-area-adjusted transaction price for all the units transacted within the same project in that quarter.27  
As discussed above, there are not many repeated house sales in Singapore.  Therefore, we rely on the 
area-adjusted median price within a project to determine the average sale price of a unit within the 
building, as the units within the same project are very homogenous. We exclude transactions that took 
place under an en bloc sales (collective sales) agreement as they are not conducted in a standard market 
and thus may bias our results.28  
 The second dataset we utilize contains the COE bidding results from April 2002 to December 
2015, which is publicly available from the Land Transport Authority.29 This data contains the COE 
quota each auction, the number of successful bids, the number of bids received, and the COE premium 
for each vehicle category in each auction.  To calculate the quarterly COE premium, we weight the COE 
premium in categories A and B by the number of successful bids in each category in each auction.  We 
then take the average of all auctions that happened in a quarter to obtain the quarterly COE premium. 
The quarterly COE quota is calculated in the same manner.   
The third dataset we use is the distance from each property to the city center, obtained from 
MapInfo, a GIS software developer. We first match the postal code of each building in the REALIS 
dataset with the postal code in MapInfo, and from this we obtain the distance from each building to the 
141 MRT stations in Singapore.30 We calculate the distance from each project to the Raffles Place MRT 
                                            
27 To calculate the area-adjusted price, we first divide the transaction price by its corresponding floor area. We then take the 
median of the area-adjusted price among all the transactions within a quarter for a particular project. We only keep records of 
projects that have at least three transactions each quarter to reduce the amount of noise in our estimates. 
28 En bloc sales refer to the sale of all the units within a housing development to a single party or a consortium/joint venture. 
The price of housing bought through an en bloc sale is usually higher than the market price. 
29 https://www.lta.gov.sg/content/dam/ltaweb/corp/PublicationsResearch/files/FactsandFigures/COE_Result_2005_2009.pdf 
 and 
http://www.lta.gov.sg/content/dam/ltaweb/corp/PublicationsResearch/files/FactsandFigures/COE_Result_2010_2013.pdf 
30 Since Singapore is a small city-country, each building has a unique postal code. 
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station to determine the distance from each building to the CBD.31 If a project has multiple buildings, we 
use the average distance from each building within a project to the city center as the distance measure 
for that project.32 We also gather information on the distance to the closest MRT station.  In one of our 
robustness checks, we restrict the sample to those properties that are more than 1,000 meters away from 
the closest MRT station. To determine the closest MRT station, we base our calculations on all 2015 
proposed and existing stations.  We use both proposed and existing MRT stations as there may be 
anticipatory effects of future subway stops on house prices. We combine these three data sets to create a 
panel data set of 2,543 projects from 2002Q2 to 2015Q4. 
 Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the area-adjusted median house price, the COE 
premium, the COE quota, and the distance to the city center for the 43,073 observations in our sample. 
The average COE premium over our sample period is 38,826 SGD, which is almost four times the 
average of the area-adjusted median house price of 10,677 SGD.  We see in Table 2.1 that there is a 
large amount of variation in the COE premiums during our sample period, ranging from 3,590 SGD to 
83,425 SGD. The quarterly COE quota ranges from 3,894 to 24,503, with an average of 12,525 
registrations. The average distance to the city center is approximately 7,000 meters if we use Raffles 
Place MRT station as the city center and is 6,470 meters if we use the City Hall MRT stop as the city 
center. Some properties are only 380 meters from the CBD, while the farthest units are 18,580 meters 
away.  
2.6 Main Results 
We begin our analysis by estimating equation (1), which gives us the effect of the COE price on 
the housing price gradient using a simple OLS regression.  Results are presented in Table 2.2.  Column 
(1) provides our baseline specification, which includes project fixed effects.  In column (2) we include 
                                            
31 As a robustness check, we use the City Hall MRT station as the city center, using the same type of distance calculation. 
32 The buildings within a project are relatively close to one another, so distance does not vary much from building to building. 
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the property index for the private non-landed housing market to capture the market trend in house prices.  
In column (3) we add an annual time trend.  Column (4) includes year-quarter fixed effects, and column 
(5) adds a planning area33 specific linear time trend.  T-statistics are reported in parentheses below each 
coefficient, which are calculated using standard errors clustered at the project level.  
Looking at Table 2.2, we see that a higher COE premium is associated with a higher median 
price in a given private residential project.  We also see that as the distance from the CBD increases, a 
higher COE premium is associated with a lower private non-landed housing price.  This is consistent 
with results in the literature regarding the urban price gradient – that as the price of transportation (i.e. a 
car) increases, individuals will pay more for housing closer to the CBD (Coulson and Engle, 1987; Anas 
and Chu, 1984; Cortright, 2008; Molloy and Shan, 2010; Bradley, 2016). 
However, as discussed above, there may be a reverse causality issue that would cause OLS 
estimates to be biased.  To address this endogeneity issue and obtain unbiased coefficient estimates, we 
instrument for the COE premium with the COE quota released each quarter.  Our first stage IV results 
are presented in Table 2.3a.  As we see in this table, the signs are as expected and are highly significant, 
indicating that we have a valid instrument.   
Table 2.3b presents the second stage coefficients from our IV regression.  Across all 
specifications, we find consistent evidence of an urban price gradient.  Note that these coefficients are 
larger than the OLS estimates produced in Table 2.2, indicating that the OLS coefficients have an 
upward bias.  Based on the coefficient estimates in column (3) and the mean of the area-adjusted median 
house price, we find that if the COE premium increases by 30,000 SGD, which is how much the 
premium increased between 2009 and 2010, then the price of centrally located private non-landed 
housing increases by approximately 8.37%. However, for units that are 10 kilometers from the city 
center, the same increase in the COE premium is associated with only a 2.19% increase in house prices. 
                                            
33 There are 30 planning areas are in our sample, out of the 55 in Singapore. 
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In other words, the percent increase in the price of units 10 kilometers from the CBD is approximately 
four times less than the price increase of centrally located housing. The impact on the housing price 
gradient is consistent even after we adopt the richest controls in column (5), although in this case the 
fixed effects make us unable to identify the relationship between COE premium and house prices 
independent of distance. 
2.7 Robustness Checks 
To show that the results presented above are robust, we perform three additional tests.34 First, in 
Table 2.4 we restrict our sample to projects that are more than 1,000 meters from the closest MRT 
station,35 as these are the areas where individuals are the most likely to use a car for transportation.  As 
we see in Table 2.4, when we restrict our sample to these units, we continue to find that as the price of a 
COE increases, individuals are willing to pay more for housing that is located closer to the city center. 
 In Table 2.5 we use an alternative definition of the CBD.  In our initial regressions, we used the 
distance to the Raffles Place MRT station to calculate the distance between a housing project and the 
CBD because Raffles Place is the subway stop that is directly beneath the financial center of Singapore.  
To show that our results are not driven by our definition of the CBD, in Table 2.5 we use the City Hall 
MRT station as the city center to calculate our distance measures.  The City Hall MRT stop is located 
close to Parliament and the Supreme Court and is considered to be the center of political activity in 
Singapore. As we see in Table 2.5, our results are robust to this alternative definition of the CBD. 
 Finally, in Table 2.6 we include vehicle categories A, B, and E to calculate the COE premium 
and quota.  The majority of private vehicles use a COE from category A or B, as these categories are for 
personal vehicles.  However, category E may be used for any type of vehicle, so it is possible that the 
                                            
34 Our sample changes slightly with each robustness check. We show in Appendix Tables A3, A4, and A5 the first stage 
results for each model. In all three models, our instrument continues to be strong. 
35 More than a 1,000 meter walking distance is often considered far and inconvenient to access public transportation hubs 
given the hot and humid weather conditions of Singapore.  
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price of a COE from category E is relevant. As we see in Table 2.6, our results are consistent when we 
include this category of COEs. Overall, our results are consistent across various specifications, 
suggesting that as the price of a COE increases, residents living in the non-landed, private property 
housing market in Singapore are willing to pay more to live closer to the CBD. 
2.8 Conclusions  
We estimate the house price gradient with regards to changes in the price of transportation, 
specifically the price of registering a car, in Singapore.  Simply estimating the effect of the price of a car 
on house prices may suffer from a reverse causality issue, specifically if car ownership and housing 
farther from the city center are complementary goods.  To address this concern, we focus on Singapore, 
which has a unique feature to its car registration process that allows us to obtain causal estimates.  The 
Singaporean government, in an effort to curb traffic and congestion, requires all cars to have a 
Certificate of Entitlement (COE), which is a significant portion of the cost of acquiring a car and is one 
of the reasons the car ownership rate is low in Singapore.  These COE registrations are rationed by the 
government based on growth and traffic concerns.  Therefore, the COE quota is likely to be correlated 
with the COE price, and hence the price of a car, but uncorrelated with the price of housing, allowing us 
to use an instrumental variables strategy to obtain causal effects. 
 When we estimate the effect of the COE premium on house prices, we find that as the price of a 
COE increases, the price of housing farther from the CBD decreases. This is consistent with the 
predictions from the monocentric city model that allows for two modes of transportation. As the price of 
transportation increases, individuals will be willing to pay more to locate closer to the CBD, hence 
increasing house prices closer to the city center. We find that if the price of a COE increases by 30,000 
SGD, then the percent increase in the price of housing for units 10 kilometers from the CBD is 
approximately four times less than the price increase of centrally located housing units. Overall, our 
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findings suggest that the urban house price gradient responses to changes in the price of purchasing a car 
in Singapore. Policy makers need to be cognizant of the unintended consequences that traffic control 
policies, such as restricting the number of car registrations, have on residential house prices.   
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Figure 2.1: Bid Rent Function with One Mode of Transportation 
 
 
Bid-Rent Private Transportation 
Price of Housing 
Distance to CBD 
Bid-Rent Private Transportation 
27 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Bid Rent Function with Two Modes of Transportation 
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Figure 2.3: COE Premiums and COE Quotas 
  
Notes: This figure presents COE premiums trends and COE quotas from 2004 quarter 1 in Singapore. The data is from 
http://coe.sgcharts.com/ based on Results of Bidding Exercises for Certificates of Entitlement from Land Transport Authority. 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics  
 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Area-adjusted Median Transaction Price1 43,073 10,677.39 5,742.30 1,150 73,629 
COE Premium 43,073 38,826.45 24,786.63 3,589.50 83,425.49 
COE Quota 43,073 12,524.66 66,77.38 3,894.00 24,503.00 
Distance to Downtown Raffles Place MRT2 43,073 7.00 3.93 0.38 18.58 
Distance to Downtown City Hall MRT2 43,073 6.47 3.88 0.10 17.64 
Housing Price Index 43,073 118.77 24.71 79.60 148.90 
1 Area adjustment is achieved by dividing the unit transaction price by the corresponding floor area. 
2 Distance is measured in kilometers. 
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Table 2.2: OLS Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Area-adjusted Median Transaction Price 
(t statistics are reported in parentheses using clustered standard errors at the project level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
COE Premium 0.0947*** 0.0309*** 0.0298*** - - 
 (53.77) (17.57) (17.40) - - 
COE Premium × Distance to Downtown -0.0018*** -0.0021*** -0.0022*** -0.0022*** -0.0029*** 
 (-10.82) (-13.60) (-13.64) (-13.91) (-10.25) 
Housing Price Index - 92.6842*** 85.5108*** - - 
 - (52.38) (40.56) - - 
Year Trend NO NO YES NO NO 
Year × Quarter Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES YES 
Year Trend × Planning Area NO NO NO NO YES 
Project Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 
R-squared 0.450 0.699 0.700 0.712 0.789 
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Table 2.3a: IV Regressions – First Stage 
 (t statistics are reported in parentheses using clustered standard errors at the project level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
COE 
Premium 
COE Premium  
× Distance to 
DT 
COE 
Premium 
COE Premium 
 × Distance to 
DT COE Premium 
COE Premium  
× Distance to 
DT 
COE Premium  
× Distance to 
DT 
COE Premium  
× Distance to 
DT 
COE Quota -2.8581*** 0.5720*** -2.0146*** 6.6435*** -2.1075*** 5.9628*** - - 
 (-163.36) (4.84) (-114.17) (36.64) (-134.24) (36.88) - - 
COE Quota × 
Distance to DT -0.0095*** -3.0277*** -0.0051** -2.9956*** -0.0039** -2.9873*** -2.9591*** -2.3285*** 
 (-4.93) (-148.27) (-2.56) (-148.68) (-2.22) (-161.57) (-248.18) (-82.77) 
Housing Price 
Index - - 350.1318*** 2,520.4106*** -56.2757*** -457.9634*** - - 
 - - (79.44) (48.11) (-9.93) (-10.08) - - 
Year Trend NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Year × Quarter 
Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Year Trend × 
Planning Area NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Project Fixed 
Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 
R-squared 0.640 0.648 0.698 0.693 0.732 0.720 0.916 0.986 
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Table 2.3b: IV Regressions – Second Stage 
Dependent Variable: Area-adjusted Median Transaction Price 
(t statistics are reported in parentheses using clustered standard errors at the project level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
COE Premium 0.1196*** 0.0447*** 0.0454*** - - 
 (54.17) (21.37) (21.55) - - 
COE Premium × Distance to Downtown -0.0032*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** -0.0037*** 
 (-15.20) (-17.68) (-17.73) (-17.98) (-10.07) 
Housing Price Index - 88.9396*** 82.3325*** - - 
 - (47.47) (38.26) - - 
Year Trend NO NO YES NO NO 
Year × Quarter Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES YES 
Year Trend × Planning Area NO NO NO NO YES 
Project Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 
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Table 2.4: IV Regressions Second Stage – Projects Beyond 1,000 Meters of the Closest MRT Station  
Dependent Variable: Area-adjusted Median Transaction Price 
(t statistics are reported in parentheses using clustered standard errors at the project level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
COE Premium 0.1283*** 0.0604*** 0.0612*** - - 
 (26.75) (15.52) (15.44) - - 
COE Premium × Distance to Downtown -0.0041*** -0.0040*** -0.0041*** -0.0040*** -0.0035*** 
 (-9.90) (-11.54) (-11.56) (-11.65) (-6.03) 
Housing Price Index - 78.0234*** 71.3582*** - - 
 - (25.51) (19.64) - - 
Year Trend NO NO YES NO NO 
Year × Quarter Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES YES 
Year Trend × Planning Area NO NO NO NO YES 
Project Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 12,099 12,099 12,099 12,099 12,099 
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Table 2.5: IV Regressions Second Stage – City Hall MRT Station as the City Center 
Dependent Variable: Area-adjusted Median Transaction Price 
(t statistics are reported in parentheses using clustered standard errors at the project level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
COE Premium 0.1177*** 0.0427*** 0.0434*** - - 
 (55.46) (20.96) (21.16) - - 
COE Premium × Distance to Downtown -0.0032*** -0.0033*** -0.0033*** -0.0034*** -0.0036*** 
 (-14.83) (-17.18) (-17.23) (-17.48) (-9.75) 
Housing Price Index - 88.9397*** 82.3076*** - - 
 - (47.44) (38.28) - - 
Year Trend NO NO YES NO NO 
Year × Quarter Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES YES 
Year Trend × Planning Area NO NO NO NO YES 
Project Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 
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Table 2.6: IV Regressions Second Stage – Vehicle Categories A, B, and E  
Dependent Variable: Area-adjusted Median Transaction Price 
(t statistics are reported in parentheses using clustered standard errors at the project level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
COE Premium 0.1199*** 0.0448*** 0.0449*** - - 
 (53.82) (21.79) (21.74) - - 
COE Premium × Distance to Downtown -0.0032*** -0.0035*** -0.0035*** -0.0035*** -0.0036*** 
 (-15.25) (-18.16) (-18.21) (-18.47) (-9.92) 
Housing Price Index - 88.7099*** 81.7859*** - - 
 - (46.98) (37.18) - - 
Year Trend NO NO YES NO NO 
Year × Quarter Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES YES 
Year Trend × Planning Area NO NO NO NO YES 
Project Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1: Calculation of COE Quota Premium1 
Reserve Price Bid Status Remarks 
S$100 Successful Only the first 2 bids will be successful. The COE Price (or Quota Premium) 
will be S$71. The 3rd and 4th bids (both with reserve price of S$70) are not 
accepted as then the number of successful bids would exceed the COE Quota 
of 3. The remaining 1 unallocated COE Quota will be carried forward to the 
next corresponding COE bidding exercise in the following month (i.e. 2nd 
COE Open Bidding Exercise in month (N+1). 
$88 Successful 
$70 Unsuccessful 
$70 Unsuccessful 
$41 Unsuccessful 
1 An example: COE Quota for Category A = 3. Number of bidders = 5 with reserve prices of S$100, S$88, S$70, S$70 and S$41. Source of the example: Land Transport Authority 
of Singapore. 
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Table A2: Cost of a New Mid range – Car with 7-year Usage in Singapore 
Main Components  Singapore Dollars 
Acquisition costs 
OMV (open market value) 16,000 
Customs duty 3,200 
Goods and services tax 1,344 
ARF (additional registration fee） 16,000 
Registration fee 170 
CEVS (carbon emission-based vehicle scheme) 5,000 
COE1 63,630 
Retailer margin 16,800 
Total  122,144 
Total operating costs  61,530 
Resale value incl. tax refund  -33,673 
Total cost  150,001 
Total cost/km  1.13  
Source: Kochhan, R., Lim, J., Knackfuß, S., Gleyzes, D. and Lienkamp, M., 2014. Total Cost of Ownership and Willingness-to-Pay for Private Mobility in Singapore. 
In Sustainable Automotive Technologies 2013 (pp. 251-261). Springer International Publishing. 
1This is based on the average 2012 COE bidding results. 
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Table A3: IV Regressions First Stage – Projects Beyond 1,000 Meters of MRT Station  
 (t statistics are reported in parentheses using clustered standard errors at the project level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
COE 
Premium 
COE Premium  
× Distance to 
DT COE Premium 
COE Premium 
 × Distance to 
DT 
COE 
Premium 
COE Premium  
× Distance to 
DT 
COE Premium  
× Distance to 
DT 
COE Premium  
× Distance to 
DT 
COE Quota -2.8279*** 0.8060*** -1.9946*** 8.3297*** -2.1041*** 7.3331*** - - 
 (-70.22) (2.73) (-49.17) (21.54) (-58.91) (21.48) - - 
COE Quota × 
Distance to DT -0.0117*** -3.0412*** -0.0086** -3.0131*** -0.0059* -2.9884*** -2.9375*** -2.4691*** 
 (-3.06) (-80.71) (-2.21) (-80.02) (-1.70) (-87.90) (-138.20) (-51.86) 
Housing Price Index - - 338.5273*** 3,056.3486*** -65.1444*** -616.4223*** - - 
 - - (46.42) (33.31) (-6.51) (-6.43) - - 
Year Trend NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Year × Quarter 
Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Year Trend × 
Planning Area NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Project Fixed 
Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 12,099 12,099 12,099 12,099 12,099 12,099 12,099 12,099 
R-squared 0.648 0.654 0.704 0.702 0.737 0.731 0.949 0.991 
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Table A4: IV Regressions First Stage – City Hall MRT Station as the City Center  
 (t statistics are reported in parentheses using clustered standard errors at the project level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 COE Premium 
COE Premium  
× Distance to 
DT 
COE 
Premium 
COE Premium 
 × Distance to 
DT 
COE 
Premium 
COE 
Premium  
× Distance to 
DT 
COE Premium  
× Distance to 
DT 
COE 
Premium  
× Distance to 
DT 
COE Quota -2.8573*** 0.5204*** -2.0136*** 6.1534*** -2.1072*** 5.5148*** - - 
 (-170.22) (5.14) (-118.62) (36.78) (-139.09) (36.99) - - 
COE Quota × 
Distance to DT -0.0104*** -3.0295*** -0.0056*** -2.9977*** -0.0043** -2.9885*** -2.9600*** -2.3329*** 
 (-5.34) (-156.25) (-2.81) (-155.85) (-2.38) (-168.72) (-253.64) (-82.66) 
Housing Price 
Index - - 350.1057*** 2,337.4053*** -56.2764*** -433.1928*** - - 
 - - (79.42) (46.20) (-9.93) (-10.17) - - 
Year Trend NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Year × Quarter 
Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Year Trend × 
Planning Area NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Project Fixed 
Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 
R-squared 0.640 0.649 0.698 0.692 0.732 0.719 0.908 0.985 
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Table A5: IV Regressions First Stage – Vehicle Categories A, B, and E 
 (t statistics are reported in parentheses using clustered standard errors at the project level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
COE 
Premium 
COE Premium  
× Distance to 
DT COE Premium 
COE Premium 
 × Distance to 
DT 
COE 
Premium 
COE Premium  
× Distance to 
DT 
COE Premium  
× Distance to 
DT 
COE Premium  
× Distance to 
DT 
COE Quota -2.2869*** 0.4787*** -1.7299*** 4.4214*** -1.7400*** 4.3473*** - - 
 (-166.39) (5.41) (-122.94) (33.76) (-130.62) (34.60) - - 
COE Quota × 
Distance to DT -0.0077*** -2.4267*** -0.0042*** -2.4018*** -0.0030* -2.3931*** -2.3713*** -1.8776*** 
 (-5.22) (-161.48) (-2.60) (-153.83) (-1.95) (-157.73) (-264.00) (-83.79) 
Housing Price 
Index - - 288.0990*** 2,039.1012*** -5.4179 -97.1091** - - 
 - - (67.20) (47.35) (-0.95) (-2.27) - - 
Year Trend NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Year × Quarter 
Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Year Trend × 
Planning Area NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Project Fixed 
Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 43,073 
R-squared 0.682 0.693 0.714 0.717 0.733 0.731 0.927 0.987 
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Chapter 3 Home Equity and the Timing of Claiming Social Security Retirement Income  
(Coauthored with Jing Li and Amanda Ross) 
3.1 Introduction  
It is widely recognized that the United States, like many other countries, is moving into 
an aging society.  The proportion of individuals over the age of 65 in the U.S. rose from 8% in 
1950 to 13% in 2010 and is expected to rise to over 20% by 2030 as the Baby Boomer 
generation continues to age (Lee, 2014).  The rapid increase in the share of the elderly population 
is something policy makers are cognizant of, as it raises concerns regarding the financial 
readiness of the retirement system for a dramatic increase in individuals filing for Social 
Security.  Among the various sources of financial assets of the elderly, Social Security 
Retirement Income (SSRI) and home equity are the two largest components of an elderly 
household’s balance sheet.36  Therefore, a better understanding of how elderly households utilize 
these assets has become increasingly important when designing policy.  
 This paper studies the extent to which elderly households make decisions on financing 
retirement using SSRI and housing equity.  Elderly individuals who need additional wealth and 
are at the eligible age to receive Social Security can choose to start receiving SSRI.  However, if 
these individuals start receiving SSRI as soon as they become eligible, the monthly benefit is 
lower than if the individual delayed a few years. 37  We examine if elderly individuals are more 
likely to start receiving SSRI later when house prices increase.  In other words, our research 
examines the trade-off between these two assets, as elderly individuals may choose to draw upon 
                                            
36  Retirement support includes pensions, housing equity, financial equity, and other savings. Social security 
retirement income and home equity are the two largest components of household balance sheet, especially for the 
bottom two-thirds of the wealth distribution for households aged 65-69 (Poterba 2014). 
37 Sixty two is the age when individuals become eligible to receive SSRI. Sixty five is generally considered as the 
full retirement age (varies slightly across cohorts).  If individuals delay receiving SSRI from 62 to 65, for example, 
the benefit level as a percent of the primary insurance amount would rise from 80% to 100% accordingly.  We will 
describe the specifics of the program and how the benefits vary based on the age individuals start to claim SSRI later 
in the paper. 
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their home equity and delay receiving SSRI benefits when the value of their house increases.  
Studying this issue will allow us to gain a better understanding of the substitutability of these two 
assets as a source of income for the aged population.  The implications of our research are 
important for policy makers, as our findings will aid in designing suitable policies to help the 
rising number of senior citizens adjust to fluctuations in the price of housing. 
 We focus on the role of home equity to finance retirement life due to the rising 
importance of home equity in the investment portfolio of the elderly.  Based on the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the average ratio of home equity to total household 
net worth was 36.07% in 2005 for individuals under the age of 35 and this ratio increased to 
more than 45% as individuals reach 65 years old (shown in Figure 1). Due to the fact that the 
elderly had a larger amount of home equity prior to the Great Recession, they suffered a more 
substantial decrease in total assets after the decline in real estate prices in 2007 (also shown in 
Figure 1).  The deterioration in home equity likely impacts elderly individuals directly through 
the wealth effect and indirectly through the home equity-based borrowing channel (Mian, Rao, 
and Sufi, 2013).  The latter implies that a decline in house values reduces the ability and amount 
that the elderly can receive through home equity loans to finance their retirement expenses. 
 For senior citizens, one way to supplement income if there is a decline in house value is 
to adjust when they start receiving SSRI.  Individuals are eligible to receive SSRI at the early 
retirement age of 62.  However, they may choose to delay the withdrawal decision to the full 
retirement age38 since delaying the receipt of benefits will increase the amount received in each 
pay check.  Research has shown that there are peaks in Social Security benefits claiming at the 
                                            
38 Full retirement age varies between 65 and 66, depending on when the individual was born. But social health 
insurance, Medicare, which provides benefits for Americans aged 65 and older, may also be a factor that affects the 
decision to retire at age 65 (Madrian, Burtless, and Gruber, 1994; Rust and Phelan, 1997; Blau and Gilleskie, 2006 
and 2008; French and Jones, 2011). 
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beginning of the eligibility age and the full retirement age (Behaghel and Blau, 2012). During the 
housing boom period from 2000 to 2006, the take-up rate39 at the age 62 declined from 45% to 
38%. The early take-up rate rose again to 42% in 2009 during the housing bust period (Coe and 
Rutledge, 2012). These statistics suggest that elderly individuals are more likely to delay 
receiving Social Security when housing appreciates in value and may start to withdraw early 
when experiencing housing market downturns. 
 However, there are likely to be endogeneity issues present when considering interactions 
between housing wealth and SSRI withdrawal decisions. Specifically, there may be unobserved 
local demand shocks that are correlated with changes in house prices that also affect when an 
elderly individual decides to start receiving SSRI.  For example, when house prices decline in an 
area, it is likely that the local economy is experiencing a negative demand shock in both the labor 
market and housing market.  Therefore, this shock may affect the labor market opportunities and 
the income of elderly households, which will affect the likelihood of claiming SSRI, while 
simultaneously affecting local house prices. 
 To address this endogeneity problem, we utilize an instrumental variables strategy.  We 
draw upon geographic variation in the land supply elasticity of an MSA, developed by Saiz 
(2010), as the topological characteristics of an area are not likely to be correlated with local 
demand shocks to the economy.  We interact this supply elasticity measure with the change in 
the national house price index and use this interaction term as an instrument for the change in 
local house prices.  Our identifying assumption is that the cross-sectional variation in local house 
                                            
39 The ratio of new claimants at the end of the year to the eligible individuals who had not claimed at the beginning 
of the year. 
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prices from the national average is driven by differences in local land supply elasticities, which is 
not correlated with time-varying local economic activity.40   
 We find that larger increases in house prices are associated with delayed SSRI claiming 
during the boom period from 2002-2006.  During the bust period from 2007-2009, we do not 
find a statistically significant effect on SSRI claiming, which is consistent with the idea that the 
cashing-out of home equity is only a viable channel to finance retirement when house prices 
appreciate. Specifically, we find that if the housing value increases by 10% in the previous two 
years leading to the eligibility year, the probability of claiming SSRI within one year once they 
become eligible reduced by 0.05, and the probability of claiming SSRI within two years reduced 
by 0.06. Our findings are consistent across various specifications. Overall, our results suggest 
that when house prices increase, and thus home equity, elderly individuals delay receipt of SSBI.   
 We have further extended our work to look into the impact of home equity on retirement 
decisions.41 We find that larger increases in house prices are associated with earlier retirement 
during the boom period.  Similarly, we find that when house prices depreciate during the bust 
period, individuals retire later but the effect is of a smaller magnitude. These results are 
consistent with retirement decisions cycling with market fluctuations potentially due to wealth 
effects.  However, during the market boom period, given the additional channel to cash-out home 
equity, senior citizens tend to be more responsive to the accumulated home equity and are more 
likely to retire early.  We also show that pension eligibility plays a role in the impact of house 
price appreciation on retirement decisions. 
                                            
40 This instrument has been used previously in the literature by Mian and Sufi (2011), Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar 
(2012), Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013), and Cvijanović (2014). 
41 Recent research has studied the relationship between housing wealth and the retirement and/or labor supply 
decision (Ondrich and Falevich, 2016; Zhao and Burge, 2017a; Zhao and Burge, 2017b).  These papers utilize other 
identification strategies, which we will discuss in detail later in the paper. 
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 Our research contributes to the existing literature by highlighting the trade-off that elderly 
households make when deciding whether to draw upon housing equity in retirement or to start 
receiving Social Security benefits.  The majority of the existing literature has focused primarily 
on the relationship between local labor market shocks and the decision to withdraw SSRI, with 
any discussion of home equity being a secondary consideration (Coile and Levine, 2007, 2011a, 
2011b; Goda, Shoven and Slavov, 2011).  Another strand of literature focusing on the role of 
home equity has examined how changes in house prices affects the decision to retire and leave 
the labor market (Disney, Ratcliffe, and Smith, 2015; Farnham and Sevak, 2007; Ondrich and 
Falevich, 2016; Zhao and Burge, 2017a; Zhao and Burge, 2017b).  We expand upon this 
literature by directly drawing a link between how elderly individuals make the decision to start 
receiving SSRI benefits versus using their home equity to finance expenditures.  Previous 
literature has found little evidence that elderly households draw down their housing equity to 
finance their expenses (Venti and Wise 1989, 1991, and 2004; Sheiner and Weil, 1993; Hurd, 
2002).  However, our research conducts analysis separately for boom and bust period and uses a 
more robust identification strategy through an instrumental variables approach to obtain causal 
estimates of the effect of house price fluctuations on the decision to receive SSRI. 
 The rest of the paper will proceed as follows.  Section 2 discusses the institutional details 
of Social Security Retirement Income in the United States, as well as literature related to SSRI 
claiming, retirement, and home equity of the elderly.  We discuss our data in Section 3 and our 
identification strategy is outlined in Section 4.  Section 5 describes our main results and we show 
a series of robustness checks in Section 6.  Section 7 concludes. 
3.2 Social Security Retirement Income in the United States  
Individuals are eligible to receive SSRI if they have been working for at least ten years 
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and are at least 62 years old.42  The amount of Social Security benefits received is based on the 
worker’s average indexed earnings over the highest amount he or she earned over 35 years.  
However, the benefit amount is then adjusted based on when the individual starts receiving 
SSRI, penalizing individuals for claiming before the full retirement age (FRA) of 65. 
Furthermore, workers can receive additional benefits if they delay receiving OASI payments 
beyond age 65, increasing benefits each year with a cap at 70 years old (Song and Manchester, 
2007).43   
The Social Security Advisory Board summarizes the decision an elderly individual has to 
make by stating that: “If you withdraw early, you may not have enough income to enjoy the 
years ahead of you. Likewise, if you withdraw late, you’ll have a larger income, but fewer years 
to enjoy it. Everyone needs to find the right balance based on his or her own circumstances” 
(Social Security Advisory Board 2009). The AARP website begins its advice about when to 
claim Social Security benefits with the statement: “If you’re healthy and can afford it, you should 
consider waiting until you reach your full retirement age.”44 
 Several changes were made to the program in 2000.  First, the retirement earnings test, 
which penalized individuals for working while receiving Social Security through lower benefits, 
was removed for individuals who did not receive benefits until after the full retirement age.  The 
second change was that the FRA was increased, based on the year of birth of the individual.  
However, the earliest age at which an individual could receive Social Security remained at 62. In 
this paper, we focus on the decision to withdraw SSRI within one or two years once individuals 
reach 62 years old. 
                                            
42 Originally, workers could not claim SS benefits until the age of 65.  However, in 1962 the program was adopted 
to allow workers to retire at age 62 at a reduced benefit. 
43 There is an ongoing debate regarding whether the penalties for early take-up are actuarially fair.  For more 
information on this literature and debate, see Myers and Schobel (1990) and Goda, Shoven, and Slavov (2012). 
44 http://www.aarp.org/work/social-security/info-12-2010/top-25-social-security-questions.5.html. 
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 In addition to receiving SSRI, individuals may have pension accounts and other 
retirement benefits through their employers.   
3.3 Theoretical Background 
As Social Security has become an increasingly important policy in the U.S., there has 
been a growing literature examining what affects an individual’s decision to start receiving SSRI, 
given that delaying results in higher benefits.  Crawford and Lilien (1981) have argued that the 
main reason individuals start receiving SSRI is a liquidity constraint, where low-income workers 
do not save enough while working and therefore claim earlier to finance consumption during 
retirement.  Individuals with longer life expectancy also tend to delay claiming SSRI (Munnell 
and Soto, 2005).  Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos (2004) show that subjective assessments of 
mortality risk are associated with early retirement and early claiming.   Behavioral economists 
argue that the decision is affected by the institutional details of Social Security system. Brown, 
Kapteyn, and Mitchell (2011) show that when an individual self-reports that he/she will start 
claiming SSRI depends on the way in which the decision is framed. Other explanations include 
reference dependence with loss aversion, where individuals have a frame regarding when they 
will retire and chose to start claiming at that age, regardless of what may be the optimal strategy 
to maximize lifetime utility (Behaghel and Blau, 2012).  Publically provided health insurance, 
specifically Medicare, may also affect the timing of retirement.  Most workers lose employer-
provided health insurance upon retiring.  Therefore, workers may delay retirement until age 65 
not because of the SSRI benefits, but to ongoing health insurance coverage (Madrian, Burtless, 
and Gruber, 1994; Rust and Phelan, 1997; Blau and Gilleskie, 2006 and 2008; French and Jones, 
2011). 
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 However, there is little evidence on the effect of wealth, specifically unexpected shocks 
to wealth, on claiming SSRI. Previous literature examining the impact of wealth shock on elderly 
individuals has mainly focused the decision to retire.  Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (2001) find 
significant labor supply effects of winning the lottery, particularly among individuals aged 55 to 
65.  Sevaj (2002) exploits the bull market of the 1990s to study the effect of unexpected capital 
gains on retirement timing.  He shows that increases in wealth led to increases in the probability 
of retirement among individuals ages 55 to 60.   
 The decision to retire and the timing of receiving SSRI are intertwined. Hurd and Boskin 
(1981) find that the Social Security benefit increases from 1969 to 1972 can explain a large 
amount of the acceleration of the number of people retiring in that period.  Chan and Stevens 
(2008) find that individuals’ retirement ages respond to pension incentives.  The Social 
Security’s Delayed Retirement Credit raised employment rates among workers over age 65 and 
the Social Security reform in 1983 that increased the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) tended to 
increase the retirement age (Pingle 2006, Mastrobuoni 2009). Coile and Levine (2007) show that 
retirements increase in response to an increase in the unemployment rate, only when workers hit 
age 62, suggesting that access to SSRI benefits may allow older workers to weather the financial 
shock associated with job loss by retiring.  
 A significant segment of the population appears to be income-poor and house-rich 
(Mayer and Simons, 1994; Merrill, Finkel, and Kutty, 1994), so drawing upon housing equity is 
a potentially important source of wealth for the elderly.  Older households have a larger fraction 
of housing equity that they can use to fund home equity loans and obtain reverse mortgages 
(Sinai 2007).  There is an extensive literature examining the relationship between housing wealth 
and consumption and savings decisions (Engelhardt, 1996; Case, Quigley, and Schiller, 2005; 
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Jiang, Sun, and Webb, 2011).  A number of more recent papers have examined the effect of 
changes in housing wealth on retirement, but have found mixed results.  Disney, Ratcliffe, and 
Smith (2015) uses data from the United Kingdom to look at cyclical fluctuations in asset prices 
and the labor market on retirements but they find little evidence of any positive wealth effects. 
However, the authors do not address the endogeneity between housing price and retirement 
decision, possibly causing their estimates to be biased.  Goda, Shoven and Slavov (2011) find no 
effect of housing wealth on the retirement decision during the Great Recession.  However, 
Farnham and Sevak (2007) find that increase in housing wealth is associated with a reduction in 
expected retirement age.   
In this paper, we expand upon the existing literature by using a robust instrument to explore 
the direct substitutability between cashing-out home equity and receiving SSRI benefits with 
extensions to concurrent implications on retirement. 
3.4 Empirical Strategy 
We are interested in determining the degree to which changes in the value of a home 
affects the decision of an elderly individual to begin to receive SSRI. Recently, the U.S. 
experienced an extreme increase in house price, followed by a dramatic decrease that had never 
been seen before in the country.  We look how the boom period (2002 to 2006), when house 
prices were increasing, affected the timing of beginning to receive SSRI for elderly individuals 
and the timing of retirement.  Then, we look at if there were different effects on these decisions 
during the bust period (2007 to 2009), when house prices dropped dramatically.    
 Specifically, we consider the impact of a percentage change in housing values on SSRI 
claiming once individuals are eligible. To do so, we estimate the following Probit regressions: 
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 Where  is the standard normal cumulative distribution,  in specification (1) is 
an indicator variable equal to one if individual i, living in MSA m, began receiving Social 
Security benefits within one or two years of reaching age 62 in year t.   is the 
percentage change in house value in the previous two years for individual i, living in MSA m in 
year t.   We use the two-year change in house prices due to the fact that our data, the Health and 
Retirement Survey, is a biannual survey.  We also include controls for individual attributes, , 
such as gender, race, marital status, tenure in the last job, education, and total non-housing 
wealth, to control for individual heterogeneity. We use state fixed effect  to control for 
unobservable state specific attributes and year fixed effects  to capture unobservable variables 
that are specific to a given year.  
 However, there are likely to be endogeneity issues present in the simple Probit model.  
Specifically, there are likely to be unobserved local demand shocks that are correlated with 
housing price changes and other sources of income such as waged salaries and the value of other, 
non-housing assets.  For example, if an area is experiencing a recession, this is likely to impact 
both the price of housing and employment opportunities.  Therefore, we believe that a simple 
probit or OLS model will produce biased estimates, as there are likely to be omitted variables in 
the error term.   
 To address this endogeneity issue, we employ an instrumental variables strategy.  For our 
instrument, we use the land topology-based measure of housing supply elasticity introduced by 
Saiz (2010) interacted with the change in the national housing price index. For a given shift in 
housing demand, an MSA with a more inelastic housing supply (i.e. an area with more 
mountains or near water such as New York City, NY or San Francisco, CA) should experience 
large house price changes than the national change in house prices, while MSAs with a more 
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elastic housing supply (i.e. flat areas such as Houston, TX) should experience a more modest 
change.  This measure of the supply elasticity is likely to be exogenous to local demand shocks, 
as this is a supply-side measure versus a demand-side measure.  In addition, national house 
prices are likely to be correlated with local house prices, but not necessarily other local demand 
factors such as the local labor market.  This interaction term has been used previously in the 
literature by Mian and Sufi (2011, 2013, 2014), Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012) and 
Cvijanovi (2014) as an instrument for changes in local house prices.  
 Therefore, we use the following specification for our first stage regression: 
  
where  is the percentage change in the national housing price index in the previous two 
years,  is the Saiz (2010) estimate of the housing supply elasticity in MSA m,  is a 
state fixed effect and  represents time fixed effects.  captures omitted variables in household 
housing wealth change. 
3.5 Data and Summary Statistics 
This study uses restricted access data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) from 
1992 to 2012.  Given that the instrumental variable we employ is at the MSA level, we need to 
use the restricted data to have the necessary geographic detail to conduct our analysis.  The HRS 
is a longitudinal household data set of more than 26,000 Americans over the age of 50 every two 
years. The sample we use in our analysis includes a total of 19,787 individuals after preliminary 
screening.45  
                                            
45 We start with a sample of 37,319 elderly individuals. We exclude 4,969 individuals who report receiving Social 
Security benefits before 62 years old. We also exclude the 706 respondents who report ever receiving disability 
retirement benefits. Further, we include only individuals whom we observe before they turn 60 (two years before the 
eligibility age for pension withdrawal), which causes us to lose another 11,857 respondents.  
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 The HRS data is an extraordinarily rich data set on the retirement decisions and health 
status of the elderly in the United States.  We draw upon a few key variables for our analysis.  
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics of these variables.  Looking at this table, we see that over 
54% of people claim SSRI benefits within one year of becoming eligible and 64% claim SSRI 
within two years of becoming eligible.  In a given year, 38% of the sample had retired and left 
the labor force.  The average percentage change in housing value over two years is 10%.  
However, we see in Table 3.1 that there is a large amount of variation in percentage change in 
housing values, ranging from -65% to 216%. About 54% respondents are female, 86% are white, 
and 83% are married. Older workers with more than ten years of service at in their last job 
accounts for 35% of our sample.  Approximately 56% of the sample has completed high school 
and 26% have a college degree.  
 Controlling for the potential endogeneity of local real estate prices in an SSRI claiming 
decision is important for any researcher interested in causal effects. Following Mian and Sufi 
(2011, 2014), Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012), Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013), and Cvijanović 
(2014), we instrument for local real estate prices using the interaction between the change in the 
national house price index and the local housing supply elasticity. Local housing supply 
elasticities are provided by Saiz (2010) and are available for 269 MSAs. Saiz (2010) estimates 
land supply elasticities by processing satellite-generated data on elevation and the presence of 
bodies of water.  
 To obtain the national house price index, we use the quarterly index created by the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency.46 We use national house price index rather than MSA house 
price since the latter is likely to be correlated with factors associated with local demand 
conditions, and hence would not be a valid instrument. The identifying assumption of using the 
                                            
46 http://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/House-Price-Index-Datasets.aspx#qat. 
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interaction between the MSA supply elasticity and the change in the national house price index is 
that any deviation from the national trend in house prices is due to differences in the supply 
elasticity of the area, which is not correlated with local demand shocks.  For example, San 
Francisco, CA will experience a more dramatic fall in prices than Houston, TX when national 
house prices fall, not because of local demand factors but because of the ability to supply 
additional housing more easily in Houston than in San Francisco. 
 We then the match MSA and county using the Geographic Correspondence Engine.47 
Given that we use the MSA-level housing supply elasticity as our instrument, we must limit our 
sample to those counties located within an MSA covered by the Saiz (2010) topography-based 
elasticity measure. We also drop households that experienced a percent change in housing prices 
above the 99th percentile and below the 1st percentile, as well as individuals who didn’t move in 
the previous two years to ensure the full exposure to the change in home equity due to price 
appreciation/depreciation. This reduces the sample to 5,526 individuals within 1,235 counties in 
215 MSAs. 
3.6 Effect of House Price Changes on SSRI Withdrawal 
We begin our analysis by estimating equation (1) using a simple Probit regression.  
Results are presented in Table 3.2.  The estimation is conducted separately for the housing boom 
period and the bust period. Column (1) focuses on whether the individuals claim SSRI within 
one year after they turn 62 during the housing boom period (2002 to 2006) while including state 
fixed effects.  In column (2), we add year fixed effects to the model. Columns (3) and (4) look at 
whether an individual claims SSBI within two years after turning 62, with column (3) including 
only state fixed effects and column (4) adding year fixed effects.  Columns (5) to (8) follow the 
same structure as columns (1) to (4) but cover the bust period (2007 to 2009).  We report 
                                            
47 http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr2k.html. 
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estimated coefficient from the Probit model in Panel A and the corresponding marginal effects in 
Panel B. T-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated using standard errors clustered 
at the MSA level. Estimates presented in Table 3.2 suggest negative but insignificant effect of 
changes in house value on Social Security benefit claiming during the boom period.  However, 
we see in column (5) to (8) that during the bust period, a decline in house price seems to decrease 
the probability of early pension withdrawal. 
 As mentioned above, OLS estimation may suffer from endogeneity issues, as unobserved 
local demand shocks will likely create correlation between house price changes and other local 
labor market conditions.  For example, a negative local demand shock may affect housing market 
outcomes and at the same time cause individuals to delay retirement due to lower wages, which 
may also delay SSRI benefit claiming, suggesting there the Probit model coefficient estimates 
may have an upward bias. To address this issue, we use an instrumental variables approach and 
instrument for house price changes using the interaction between the MSA supply elasticity and 
the change in the national house price index.  Results from the IV regression are presented in 
Table 3.3, where the columns follow the same structure as in Table 3.2.  The first stage 
regression results are presented in Panel B and suggest that our instrument is valid.  The Wald 
test of exogeneity rejects the null hypothesis that the change in housing value is an exogenous 
variable in equation (1).   
 Panel A of Table 3.3 presents the second stage coefficients from our IV regression.  We 
find a significantly negative effect of a change in house price on the likelihood of claiming SSRI 
benefits earlier during the boom period.  This suggests that when house prices increase, elderly 
individuals may delay receiving Social Security benefits, as they may cash out housing equity to 
cover expenses.  Our results indicate that when housing value increases by 10%, the probability 
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of claiming SSRI within one year reduced 0.05 once they become eligible and the probability of 
claiming SSRI within two years reduced 0.06. In contrast, we do not find a statistically 
significant effect during the housing bust period. Estimates reported in column (5) – (8) show 
negative but insignificant effects. This seems to be consistent with cashing-out home equity 
during the boom period as home equity may be a viable substitute for pension withdrawals when 
housing assets appreciate. This channel, however, shuts down when house price declines.   
3.7 Effect of SSRI on Retirement Decision 
We also extend our analysis to examine the effect of a change in house price on the 
decision to retire.  We begin by estimating the effect of changes in house prices on the decision 
to retirement using a Probit model.  These results are presented in Table 3.4.  Column (1) and (2) 
focus on the effect of a change in housing value on retirement decisions during the housing boom 
period (2002 to 2006), and column (3) to (4) show the effect during the bust period (2007 to 
2009).  The Probit estimates in Table 3.4 column (1) and (3) are not statistically significant and 
are likely to be biased due to the endogeneity issue mentioned above.  It is likely that SSRI 
eligibility will also play a role when considering the impact of home equity on the retirement 
decision.  In this regard, we further interact the percent change in house value with a dummy 
indicating whether the respondent meets the eligibility criteria to receive SSRI. We pick up 
stronger signal in this specification, especially for the interaction term.   
 To address potential endogeneity concerns, we conduct similar IV estimation and present 
our results in Table 3.5.  We find consistent evidence that higher housing values have a positive 
effect on the likelihood of retirement in both the boom and bust period. The coefficients 
estimated for the boom period tend to be of higher magnitude than that of the bust period.  When 
housing value increases 10% (percent), the probability of retirement increases 0.04 during 2002 
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to 2006.  The probability of retirement decreases 0.02, when housing value decreases 10% 
during 2007 to 2009. We think this is consistent with retirement decisions cycling with housing 
market fluctuations. Due to additional channel to cash out home equity during the housing boom 
period, the effect becomes stronger when price appreciates. 
 The coefficients associated with the interaction term between house price appreciation 
and eligibility for pension withdrawal suggest that the impact on retirement mainly comes from 
after the eligibility year during the housing boom period (Table 3.5 Column (2)).  Before turning 
62, elderly individuals tend not to respond significantly to home equity accumulation in their 
retirement decisions.  However, once they become eligible for receiving SSRI, the elderly may 
decide to retire once they have experience sufficient house price appreciations.  During the 
housing boom period, pension eligibility seems to serve as a safety net in cancelling the negative 
impact of housing price depreciations on early retirement. If house price decreases by 10%, for 
example, the likelihood of retirement for individuals below 62 years old increases 0.04. This 
effect, however, becomes almost zero once they turn 62.  
3.8 Conclusion  
We estimate the impact of changes in housing value on the SSRI claiming and retirement 
decisions.  Simple OLS methods are likely to suffer from omitted variables bias, as changes in 
the price of housing and the decision to withdraw SSRI are likely to be correlated with local 
unobserved demand shocks.  To address this concern, we use the interaction of changes in the 
national house price index and land supply elasticity at the MSA level as an instrument for the 
change in the value of a house.  This instrument has been used previously in the literature, 
allowing us to obtain causal effects. 
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 When we estimate the effect of changes in housing value on the likelihood an individual 
begins receiving SSRI with our instrumental variables approach, we find that as the housing 
price increases by 10% during the boom period, the probability an individual begins to receive 
benefits within one year decreases by 0.05 once they are eligible and the probability of 
individuals claiming SSRI within two years decreases by 0.06.  Meanwhile, we find the 
probability of retirement decrease by 0.04 as housing prices increase 10%.  While the housing 
price decreases 10% during the bust period, the probability of retirement decrease 0.02.  Pension 
eligibility also plays a role on the impact of home equity on retirement. 
 Overall, our findings suggest that the elderly seems to treat home equity and SSRI as 
substitutes when financing retirement.  It appears that most of this trade-off is during boom 
periods, but not when house prices decline.  This is consistent with cashing-out home equity as a 
viable option only when house price appreciates. Furthermore, we see that when house values 
increase, individuals are more likely to retire, possibly because the increase in this asset allows 
them to finance retirement more.  Our findings are important for policy makers in designing 
relevant policies after having a better understanding of the substitutability between these two 
assets. 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics  
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Withdraw within 1 year 0.5432 0.4982 0 1 
Withdraw within 2 years 0.6431 0.4791 0 1 
Retired 0.3804 0.4855 0 1 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years 0.1005  0.3034 -0.6571 2.1634 
Female 0.5390 0.4985 0 1 
White 0.8557 0.3514 0 1 
Married 0.8310 0.3748 0 1 
Tenure one to five years 0.2147 0.4106 0 1 
Tenure five to ten years 0.1138 0.3176 0 1 
Tenure more than ten years 0.3472 0.4761 0 1 
High school 0.5561 0.4969 0 1 
College 0.2559 0.4364 0 1 
Non-housing Wealth 361070 1430634 -814000 90100000 
Self-assessed health status 2.4671 0.9930 1 5 
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Table 3.2: Probit Regressions - Pension Withdrawal within 1 or 2 years after Becoming Eligible1 
 (t statistics are reported in parentheses using clustered standard errors at the MSA level) 
 
 2002 – 2006 2007- 2009 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable Withdraw within 1 Year Withdraw within 2 Years Withdraw within 1 Year Withdraw within 2 Years 
Panel A: Probit Regression Coefficient 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years -0.1295 -0.1048 -0.1464* -0.1143 0.5617** 0.7522** 0.5636* 0.8456** 
 (-1.31) (-1.06) (-1.77) (-1.39) (1.99) (2.35) (1.85) (2.35) 
         
         
Panel B: Marginal Effect 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years -0.0441 -0.0357 -0.0485* -0.0374 0.1846** 0.2455** 0.1863* 0.2775** 
 (-1.31) (-1.06) (-1.77) (-1.39) (2.01) (2.39) (1.86) (2.35) 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 1600 1600 1578 1578 653 653 640 640 
Log Pseudolikelihood -960.5648 -957.7640 -919.5976 -908.7914 -377.6022 -375.1797 -373.0571 -370.4327 
1 Other control variables include gender, race, marital status, tenure in the last job, education, total non-housing wealth, and self-assessed health. 
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Table 3.3: IV Probit Regressions - Pension Withdrawal within 1 or 2 Years after Becoming Eligible1 
 (t statistics are reported in parentheses using clustered standard errors at the MSA level) 
 
 2002 – 2006 2007- 2009 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: Second-Stage 
Dependent Variable Withdraw within 1 Year Withdraw within 2 Years Withdraw within 1 Year Withdraw within 2 Years 
 Probit Regression Coefficient 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years -1.0945** -1.5391*** -1.4400*** -1.6462*** -0.1165 -0.2593 -0.3244 -0.3230 
 (-2.14) (-2.74) (-2.82) (-2.83) (-0.19) (-0.44) (-0.56) (-0.55) 
 Marginal Effect 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years -0.3345** -0.5111*** -0.5051*** -0.6254*** -0.0465 -0.1024 -0.1186 -0.1182 
 (-2.14) (-2.73) (-2.79) (-2.83) (-0.19) (-0.45) (-0.56) (-0.55) 
Panel B: First-Stage 
Dependent Variable ∆% in House Value in Previous 2 Years 
∆% in U.S. HPI in previous 2 years 2.4312*** - 2.3837*** - 2.1927*** - 2.1712*** - 
 (6.81) - (6.68) - (7.38) - (7.46) - 
∆% in U.S. HPI in previous 2 years × 
MSA land supply elasticity -0.5422*** -0.5118*** -0.5399*** -0.5218*** -0.4695*** -0.4651*** -0.4657*** -0.4659*** 
 (-5.05) (-4.61) (-4.91) (-4.67) (-3.57) (-3.51) (-3.64) (-3.61) 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Wald Test of Exogeneity  3.67 4.89 5.56 4.83 3.52 4.32 6.73 6.74 
Observations 1197 1197 1181 1181 486 486 477 477 
Log Pseudolikelihood -955.9601 -951.2390 -885.3643 -874.6170 -90.6797 -88.6880 -85.0922 -85.0911 
1 Other control variables include gender, race, marital status, tenure in the last job, education, total non-housing wealth, and self-assessed health status. 
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Table 3.4: Probit Regressions - Retirement Decision1 
 (t statistics are reported in parentheses using clustered standard errors at the MSA level) 
 
 2002 – 2006 2007- 2009 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Retirement Status (1 – retired; 0 - otherwise) 
Panel A: Probit Regression Coefficient 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years 0.0148 -0.5891*** 0.0812 -0.0806 
 (0.30) (-5.87) (0.82) (-0.57) 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years × 
Eligible for Pension Withdrawal 
- 0.8522*** - 0.2556* 
- (8.19) - (1.86) 
Panel B: Marginal Effect 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years 0.0045 -0.1777*** 0.02164 -0.0215 
 (0.30) (-5.97) (0.82) (-0.57) 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years × 
Eligible for Pension Withdrawal 
- 0.2571*** - 0.0681* 
- (8.50) - (1.87) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Age Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 9125 9125 4113 4113 
Log Pseudolikelihood -4920.2133 -4876.6623 -1954.3837 -1951.8035 
1 Other control variables include gender, race, marital status, tenure in the last job, education, total non-housing wealth, and self-assessed health status. 
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Table 3.5: IV Probit Regressions - Retirement Decision1 
 (t statistics are reported in parentheses using clustered standard errors at the MSA level) 
 
 2002 – 2006 2007- 2009 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Second-Stage 
Dependent Variable Retirement Status (1 – retired; 0 - otherwise) 
 Probit Regression Coefficient 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years 1.3950*** 0.3128 0.6948*** 1.5902*** 
 (3.55) (0.45) (2.66) (3.14) 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years × 
Eligible for Pension Withdrawal 
- 1.9046*** - -1.4705** 
- (5.98) - (-2.13) 
 Marginal Effect 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years 0.3895*** 0.0847 0.1586*** 0.4072*** 
 (3.55) (0.46) (2.66) (3.12) 
∆% in house value in previous 2 years × 
Eligible for Pension Withdrawal 
- 0.5157*** - -0.3765*** 
- (5.96) - (-2.13) 
Panel B: First-Stage 
Dependent Variable 
∆% in House Value in 
Previous 2 Years 
∆% in House Value in 
Previous 2 Years 
∆% in HV  
× Eligible for PW 
∆% in House Value in 
Previous 2 Years 
∆% in House Value 
in Previous 2 Years 
∆% in HV 
× Eligible for PW 
∆% in U.S. HPI in previous 2 years × MSA 
land supply elasticity 
-0.2849** -0.3369*** 0.0271 -0.4085*** -0.3804*** 0.0341 
(-2.33) (-2.76) (0.35) (-3.97) (-3.86) (1.61) 
∆% in U.S. HPI in previous 2 years × 
Eligible for Pension Withdrawal 
- -0.1215* 1.7002*** - 0.1276 1.8525*** 
- (-1.70) (10.51) - (0.69) (6.02) 
∆% in U.S. HPI in previous 2 years × MSA 
land supply elasticity × Eligible for 
Pension Withdrawal 
- 0.0907** -0.3033*** - -0.0493 -0.4444*** 
- (2.07) (-4.26) - (-0.70) (-3.53) 
Wald Test of Exogeneity 9.32 64.13 5.80 8.43 
Observations 6844 6844 2963 2963 
Log Pseudolikelihood -4654.1125 -494.5766 -951.2854 1417.4989 
1 Other control variables include age, gender, race, marital status, tenure in the last job, education, total non-housing wealth, and self-assessed health status. All specifications also include year fixed effects, state 
fixed effects, and age fixed effects. 
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Figure 3.1: Ratio of Home Equity to Household Net Worth in 2005 and 2011 
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Chapter 4 The Role of Speculation on the Price informativeness: Evidence from 
Macroprudential Policies in Singapore Housing Market 
(Coauthored with Jing Li) 
4.1 Introduction 
The recent housing and financial crisis has highlighted the need for macroprudential 
policies which aim to address the systematic risks.  Based on the IMF Global Macroprudential 
Policy Instruments (GMPI) survey, countries generally use 2.5 times more macroprudential 
measures in 2013 than in 2000 (Ceruttia, Claessens and Laeven, 2017).  Examples of the 
macroprudential tools employed are countercyclical capital requirements and time-varying loan-
to-value (LTV). 48   While macroprudential approach is in principle to lower excessive 
procyclicality, the usage of macroprudential policies may generate unintended consequences 
(Claessens 2015; Crowe, Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Rabanal, 2013; Hanson, Kashyap and Stein, 
2011).  This paper explores the potential impact of unexpected transaction tax on price 
informativeness in Singapore real estate market. 
One key feature of housing is that it has duel natures – consumption and investment.  It is 
the investment component that plays a significant role in driving up the price and forming 
bubbles especially when market participants have excessive expectation of capital gains (Case 
and Shiller, 2003; Dusansky and Koç, 2007; Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai, 2005).  However, it 
is typically hard to identify investment incentive from consumption purpose in home purchase.  
This paper utilizes a unique feature of Singapore housing market that most transactions happen 
before the consumption feature is ready and the uncompleted property market attracts investors 
                                            
48 For more examples of macroprudential policy tools, please refer to Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2017) 
Ceruttia, Claessens and Laeven (2017), Galati (2013), etc.  
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(Fu and Qian, 2014; Fu, Qian, and Yeung 2015).  We are interested in how short-term 
investment behavior in this segment of market affects the price informativeness. 
To investigate whether the price reflect all the information, the ideal situation would be 
that we compare price of two similar goods transacted at the same time so that we can control for 
observed characteristics and time varying effect.49  In practice, real estate is typically highly 
heterogeneous and thinly traded over long holding periods (Krainer,2001; Lin and Vandell, 
2007).  However, we could overcome the limitations to some extent.  All units within each 
residential project in Singapore are very homogeneous before individual household move in, 
given that they will be all fully furnished by developers with the same interior design, the same 
type of furnishing, the same major electrics, and the same outdoor facilities (Baltagi and Li, 
2015).  On the other hand, 90% new houses are sold out within a few years during the 
construction.  This means that, after adjusting for observed characteristics, we have essentially 
identical units transacted at near time. 
We define transactions that are purchased and will be sold before the completion of 
property as speculative purchase.  Figure 1a shows this measure at quarter level, and Figure 1b 
shows the ratio of quarterly speculative purchases over the total quarterly transactions of 
uncompleted housing units.  The number of speculative purchases and the total transactions are 
moving towards the same direction until Q1 2011, when the sellers’ stamp duty increases 
dramatically.  The ratio jumps from 4.92% in Q4 2010 to 0.62% in Q1 2011, and subsequently 
goes to zero.  The ratio also decreases after the two policies in December 2006 and October 2007 
but the ratio becomes high at Q1 2009 when housing price index is historically low, which may 
                                            
49 The idea is similar to testing the law of one price, which states that identical goods must have identical prices in 
competitive markets with no transaction costs and no barriers to trade.  The law of one price stems from pure theory 
of international economics and has been extensively studied in international trade (e.g. Ardeni, 1989; Baffes, 1991; 
Richardson, 1978) or financial market (e.g. Garleanu and Heje Pedersen, 2011; Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam, 
2007). 
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suggest that speculators may have incentive to purchase units when market is in bust. It might 
also imply that two policies in 2006 and 2007 do not have long lasting effect.50 
Using countercyclical polices that were announced with immediate effect as exogeneous 
transaction shock, we first estimate the possibility of speculative purchase and then study price 
pattern over sales sequence within the same real estate development.  We find that speculative 
trade decreases by 10.35% after dramatic increase in transaction cost if one chose to speculate 
and price of similar houses increases more over sales sequence.  Specifically, comparing a unit 
that was purchased immediately after the launch of sale and another housing unit that was 
purchased 12 months later, the difference of price per square meter increases 0.276 % after the 
dramatic increase in transaction cost.  Our findings are consistent across various specifications, 
such as restricting sample to projects having only one construction phase, including units that 
have transactions before and after policy.   
Our paper is closely related to the discussions on macroprudential policies.  While 
macroprudential policies are widely used, our knowledge of macroprudential approach is still 
limited. Theoretically, macroprudential regulations could prevent boom and bust cycles (e.g. 
Bianchi and Mendoza (2012) for a DSGE model, Allen and Carletti (2013) for a model of real 
estate pricing).  In practice, the effect depends on specific tools and market characteristics 
(Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey, 2015; Ceruttia, Claessens and Laeven, 2017; Galati, 2013; 
Kannan, Rabanal, and Scott, 2012) and the usage of macroprudential policies may generates 
unintended consequences (Claessens 2015; Crowe, Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Rabanal, 2013; 
                                            
50 To have a comprehensive understanding of speculative trading, we construct another measure indicating the 
realization of arbitrage opportunities.  Figure 2a shows the quarterly transactions that were purchased and are sold 
before the completion of property.  Figure 2b shows the ratio of this number over total transactions of uncompleted 
properties at year-quarter level. 
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Hanson, Kashyap and Stein, 2011).  This paper explores the potential consequences of 
countercyclical policy – transaction cost in Singapore real estate market on price discovery. 
Our paper is also related to the literature on transaction tax. We demonstrate that number 
of transactions decreased after government imposed transaction cost on short-term speculators, 
which is consistent with previous papers that transaction cost could reduce trade volume and 
reduce liquidity (Kiefer, 1990; Constantinides, 1986; Wurgler, 2000). 51  Our more persistent 
price pattern along sales sequence after imposing transaction cost could imply that speculators do 
not respond to changes in expected returns by rebalancing their positions, as the gain from doing 
so might be less than the huge transaction cost (Constantinides, 1986).  The pattern also suggests 
that information is not effectively reflected into price as trade process by informed traders could 
transmit information into market (Danthine, 1978; Easley, Kiefer, and O'Hara, 1997; Easley, 
O'hara, and Srinivas, 1998; Frino and West, 2003; Froot and Perold, 1995; Glosten and Milgrom, 
1985; Grossman, 1976 and 1977; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1976 and 1980; and Kyle, 1985). 
Another strand of literature our paper is related to is on the market efficiency.  The idea 
of market efficiency has been applied extensively to theoretical models and empirical studies of 
financial securities prices since Samuelson (1965), Fama (1965; 1970) and Ross (1976).  There 
have been debates on whether speculator contribute to the market efficiency.  Market could be 
inefficient with short-term speculation (Brunnermeier, 2005; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1992), 
or speculative trade is conducive to market efficiency (Brown and Yang, 2016; Chang, Luo, and 
Ren, 2014; Cornell and Dietrich, 1978; Jaffe and Winkler, 1976), or the effect of speculators on 
the market efficiency depends on traders' characteristics (Figlewski, 1978; Tirole, 1982).  Our 
finding of more persistent price trend over sales sequence, might suggest that market is less 
informationally efficient without speculators, probably informed traders, consistent with the 
                                            
51 In our situation, the decline of speculative transactions implies the total transactions decrease.  
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finding in Fu, Qian, and Yeung (2015) who study the same policy in December 2006 and claim 
that the policy is likely to deter informed trader more than it does noise traders.  
We also contribute to the literature on price of assets over sales sequence.  Price pattern 
for similar assets sold sequentially could increase as early transactions provide additional 
information about the value of the good to later potential buyers (Milgrom and Weber, 1982), the 
declining of consumption risk (Sirmans, Turnbull, and Dombrow, 1997) or agglomeration 
economies (Rauch 1993).   Also, price could decline as the sales sequence proceeds if choice 
units tend to sell first (Ashenfelter and Genesove, 1992; Beggs and Graddy, 1997; Burguet 2005) 
or risk-averse buyers who are willing to pay a higher price in the early periods to ensure the 
opportunity to purchase (Ashenfelter, 1989).   We find that the evidence of the effect of 
transaction cost on the price over sales sequence. 
The rest of the paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the Singapore housing 
market and the policies we use. Our data is outlined in Section 3 and we discuss our 
identification strategy in Section 4. Section 5 describes our main results and some robustness 
checks.  Section 6 provide possible explanations for our finding.  We conclude in Section 7.  
4.2  Residential Property Market and Policies in Singapore 
4.2.1 Residential Property Market in Singapore 
Residential properties in Singapore are grouped into three categories: private non-landed 
properties (including private apartments and condominiums), private landed properties, and 
public housing, locally known as Housing and Development Board (HDB) flats.  Based on the 
2015 General Household Survey, about 80.1% of resident households live in HDB dwelling.  
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Private non-landed properties are occupied by 13.9 % of resident households, 5.6 % of resident 
households live in landed properties, and the rest 0.3% live in other properties.52   
For our analysis, we restrict our sample to the private non-landed residential market 
before the properties are completed.  We make this restriction for several reasons.  First, private 
residential housing is likely to be affected by any market force that impacts the price of housing, 
unlike HDB flats which are heavily subsidized by the government and there are policies that 
restrict the demand and supply of public housing.53   In addition, we focus on uncompleted 
property which does not have consumption feature.   
In addition, compared to other market segments of private properties, private non-landed 
housing units are very homogenous within each residential project.  This provides an opportunity 
to explore price variation of hedonically adjusted units that are essentially the "same."  Landed 
private properties is very heterogeneous, is not frequently transacted and make up a very small 
portion of the market, less than 5%.  In contrast, private non-landed housing units within the 
same housing project are very homogenous in terms of the attributes of the units (Baltagi and Li, 
2015; Huang, Li and Ross, 2016).  This feature allows us to track the price over sales sequence 
of almost identical units in the same project.  
Singapore offers a unique opportunity to study the price trend over sales sequence in real 
estate market.  Developers are allowed to sell housing once they get sale licence from the Urban 
Redevelopment Authority, which allows the developer to commence construction and start 
selling the units upon the issue of building plan approval for the housing project.54   The initial 
                                            
52 https://www.singstat.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-
library/publications/publications_and_papers/GHS/ghs2015/ghs2015.pdf 
53 For more information on the policies and the nature of the subsidy for HDB housing flats in Singapore, see: 
https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Public-Housing-in-Singapore.pdf.  
54 Developers who are developing a housing project with more than four units are required to obtain a licence from 
the Controller of Housing before commencing construction works. There are two types of licences: sale licence and 
no-sale licence. No-sale licence allows the developer to commence construction, but is not allowed to sell any units 
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sales time would be correspondent to the time when the property is launched, and the 
construction period allows about 90% units have been sold out before completion in Singapore.  
We define uncompleted property as houses that are transacted before the issue of 
Certificate of Statutory Completion (CSC) or a Temporary Occupation Permit (TOP) from the 
government. The building can only be occupied when a CSC or TOP is granted.55  Uncompleted 
properties is widely believed to attract speculative activities in Asian market (Fu and Qian, 2014; 
Fu, Qian, and Yeung 2015; Wong, Yiu, Tse and Chau, 2006) and are more frequently transacted 
compared to the market for completed properties (Jiang, Phillips, and Yu, 2015).  
4.2.2 Policies in Residential Property Market  
We focus on four policies in housing market in Singapore, three of which apply to 
uncompleted property market and the last policy is designed to deter speculators.  In response to 
the Asian economic crisis in 1997, government announced the Concession to Defer Stamp Duty 
Payment in 1998 that allowed uncompleted property buyers to pay the stamp duty until the 
property is completed.  With accelerated housing price increase, the government withdraw the 
Concession to Defer Stamp Duty Payment in December 2006.  The government further removed 
the Deferred Payment Scheme (DPS) in 2007.  Under the Deferred Payment Scheme, 
government allowed developers to offer to purchasers of uncompleted private properties the 
option to defer part of the progress payments from 1997 and further allowed developers to offer 
the option to defer up to half of the initial down payment in November 2001.56   
                                                                                                                                            
in the development without the prior written approval of the Controller. The minimum paid-up capital, security or 
deposit for sale licence is between S$1 million and S$4 million, and it is S$100,000 for non-sale licence. 
https://www.ura.gov.sg/uol/-/media/User%20Defined/URA%20Online/Guidelines/Housing-
Developers/Criteria%20for%20Housing%20Developers%20Licence%20Apr%202016.pdf. 
55 For more details, please see https://www.bca.gov.sg/TOPCSC/csc_inspection.html. 
56 
Being carried out in 1997, Deferred Payment Scheme (DPS) allowed developers to offer to purchasers of 
uncompleted private properties the option to defer part of the progress payments due after the initial 20% down 
payment, to a later stage. In November 2001, the Government further allowed developers to offer the option to defer 
up to half of the initial 20% down payment up to the issue of Temporary Occupation Permit or any time before that. 
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Housing price starts to increase immediately and rapidly after global financial crisis in 
2008 which poses tremendous pressure on policy makers to react with countercyclical measures.  
From September 2009, government has announced ten rounds of cooling measures to curb 
investment demand for housing.  Each measure was announced with immediate effect.  Among 
these measures, the first round is specific to uncompleted properties.  The Sellers’ Stamp Duty in 
February 2010, August 2010, and January 2011 apply to both completed properties and 
uncompleted properties.  The policy requires sellers’ stamp duty if buyers purchase housing units 
after the policy announcement date and sell the house within a short period.  For example, policy 
in January 2011 requires 16%, 12%, 8%,4% tax rate of transaction price if one flips a house 
within 1 year, 2 years, 3 years and 4 years.57  
4.3 Identification Strategy 
We are interested in determining the degree to which policies affect the amount of 
speculative trading.  We look at speculative transactions that are purchased by speculators and 
will be sold.  We are also interested in the housing price trend over sales sequence after policies 
as persistent housing price trend over sales sequence might imply arbitrage opportunities.  
To do so, we first study the policies on speculative trading by using the following 
specification:       
         (1) 
Where  is the standard normal cumulative distribution,  in specification (1) is an 
indicator variable equal to one if unit i, in project p,58 is purchased in month t and will be sold 
before the construction is completed.   is the number of months from the first sale 
                                            
57 Please see Table B1 for the detail of the policies from 1998-2016, and Table B2 for the detail of Sellers’ Stamp 
Duty. 
58 In Singapore, “project” means “real estate development”. One project includes several buildings and hundreds of 
units.  
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within the same project  when unit  was transacted at time  ,  equals one if transaction 
at time  is after policy, zero otherwise.   is unit controls, such as floor and area.   is year-
by-month fixed effects.  We include a planning-region specific linear time trend or a planning-
area specific linear time trend.59  We do not control for project fixed effect and area specific year 
trend simultaneously as the function in Probit regression becomes non-concave after including so 
many dummy variables. Our result holds if area characteristics do not change significantly 
different among areas over years in the specifications without area specific year trend.  We 
address this issue in the robustness checks.  
We then study the housing price along sales sequence.  To do so, we use   
 (2) 
where the dependent variable, , is the log of area-adjusted t house price in unit  in 
project  in month .  ,  , ,  are the same as defined in equation (1).   
is project fixed effects or building fixed effects, to control for project-specific or building 
specific characteristics that could affect the price of housing,  is year-by-month fixed effects.  
To estimate the effect of policy, we exclude uncompleted units that speculator purchased before 
the policies and sell after policies.  If speculators have bargaining power to purchase units at low 
price and have power to charge higher price when they sell units, this could confounding our 
study of price pattern overall.  We address this issue in the robustness checks.   
To demonstrate the dynamics of price over sales sequence before and after policies, we 
explicitly include before policy dummies into the following regression: 
                                            
59 There are 5 planning regions in Singapore, including Central Region, East Region, North Region, North-East 
Region, and West Region. There are 55 urban planning areas spanning five planning regions. Each planning area has 
a population of about 150,000 people and is served by a town center and several neighborhood commercial/shopping 
centers.  More details can be found at 
http://www.ura.gov.sg/uramaps/?config=config_preopen.xml&preopen=Planning Boundaries&pbIndex=1. 
77 
 
(4) 
The coefficient  measures the average price at months  from the first sale within the same 
project before the policy, and coefficient  measures the average price at months  from the 
first sale within the same project after the policy,  is months  from the first 
sale within the same project.   equals one if the transaction date  is before the 
policy and zero otherwise.   equals one if the transaction date  is after the policy 
and zero otherwise.  
4.4 Data and Summary Statistics 
To conduct our analysis, we rely on transaction-level price data for all private residential 
transactions in Singapore from the Real Estate Information System (REALIS) maintained by the 
Urban Redevelopment Authority of Singapore (URA). 60  The REALIS database provides 
proprietary information on the universe of all residential property sales since January 1, 1995.61  
The data contains information on the transaction date, transaction price, unit attributes (project 
identity, building block, floor level, and living area), and project attributes (project size, location 
by postal district, completion date, and land title).   
We exclude transactions that took place under en bloc sales (collective sales) agreement 
as they are not conducted in a standard market and thus may bias our results.62  Also, we exclude 
executive condominium, which is subsidized by the government and only citizens are eligible to 
purchase.  We use transactions from December 1, 2001 when the Deferred Payment Scheme was 
implemented in November and was later removed in 2007.  We are interested in sales sequence, 
                                            
60 https://spring.ura.gov.sg/lad/ore/login/index.cfm. 
61 Sales are logged with the Singapore Land Authority (SLA) by the purchasers’ lawyers shortly after the property is 
sold. 
62 En bloc sales refer to the sale of all the units within a housing development to a single party or a consortium/joint 
venture. The price of housing bought through an en bloc sale is usually higher than the market price. 
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so we use projects with at least 10 floors and at least 40 transactions to avoid some very small 
projects.   
To keep our definition of speculative transactions consistent, we further restrict samples 
to uncompleted housing units that are transacted within 48 months from the first sale of their 
project.  One major policy that we will study later requires one to pay seller’s stamp duty if he 
sells house with holding period less than 48 months.  This restriction will not alter our result 
given that more than 99 % of uncompleted houses are purchased from developers within 48 
months from the time when the sales are launched,63  and 95.13% of units that speculators hold 
are sold out within that period.   
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics for the area-adjusted house price, months from the 
first sale, policy details, floor and area.  We have 111,160 observations, and the average area-
adjusted transaction price over our sample period is 12,751 Singapore dollars. Speculative 
purchase account for 9% of the total transactions. The average months from the first sale within 
the same project is about 8.19, which means units are sold out quickly on average once projects 
are launched, much earlier before the construction is completed.  We have enough observations 
after policies with 83%, 72%,61%, 57%, 51%, 47% of observations after the policies in 2006, 
2007, 2009, February 2010, August 2010 and 2011.  The mean floor is 11.99 with 70 as the 
highest floor.  The average size of housing unit is 122.83 square meters, and smallest house is 31 
square meters in our sample. Housing price index varies from 79.5 to 148.9 in our sample.  
4.5  Main Results and Robustness Checks 
4.5.1 Main Result 
                                            
63 99.47 % is based on the whole sample, 99.49% if we confine sample to project with first sale after policy in June 
1998 and 99.68%% if we confine sample to project with first sale after policy in November 2001.  
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We begin our analysis by estimating equation (1), and Table 4.2 shows the result.  We 
control for project fixed effect, floor, area and housing price index in Column (1), and control for 
year-quarter fixed effect instead of price index in Column (3). Column (2) and (4) are 
corresponding marginal effect.  The evidence for Seller’s Stamp Duty in 2011 is more 
prominent, although there are some evidences for other policies.  It shows that the probability of 
speculative purchase decreases by 10.35% after the huge increase in transaction cost in 2011. 
We then look at the effect of policies on price over sales sequence.  Table 4.3 studies 
policies before the financial crisis, Table 4.4 presents policies after the financial crisis and Table 
4.5 shows all policies.  In each table, Column (1) provides our baseline specification, which 
includes project fixed effects, unit characteristics, policy dummies and year-quarter fixed 
effect.64  In column (2), we use year-month fixed effect.  In column (3) we add a planning region 
specific linear time trend.  Column (4) we add a planning area specific linear time trend.  Column 
(5) - (8) are the same with column (1) – (4), except that we use building fixed effect instead of 
project fixed effect. The most extensive specification is column (8).  T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses below each coefficient, which are calculated using standard errors clustered at the 
project level.65  
 Looking at Table 4.3, we see that price have upward trend over sales sequence overall.   
Policy in 2006 does not have significant effect on price on average or price sequence, but policy 
in 2007 have effect on price sequence at 5% significant level.  If one unit that is transacted 12 
months later than another similar unit that was sold immediately once the sale was launched, the 
difference of area adjusted price between two units increase 0.0288 % after the policy.  The sign 
                                            
64 We do not present result of column (1) in Table 4.5 for space purpose. Result are available upon request.  
65 For probit regression, Z-statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient, which are calculated using 
standard errors clustered at the planning area level.  Results hold if we cluster standard errors clustered at the project 
level. 
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of floor and area are consistent with the practice in Singapore where the area adjusted price 
increase with floor and decreases with the total area.  
Then we look at recent cooling measures in Table 4.4.  Only the harsh increase in 
transaction tax have significant and strong effect on sales sequence.  Table 4.4 shows that the 
price trend become much steeper after the dramatic increase in sellers’ stamp duty.  For example, 
if unit A was sold 12 months later than unit B that was sold at the beginning of the sales 
sequence, the area adjusted price difference between unit A and unit B would increase 0.0276% 
after the dramatic increase in Sellers’ Stamp Duty.   
We study all the policies together in Table 4.5. The results are similar to that in Table 4.3 
and Table 4.4.  The significance on the interaction term of months from the first sale and policy 
2007 changes from 5% to 1%, but the result of Seller’s Stamp Duty in 2011 is very consistent.  
Policy in 2007 and 2011 have significant effect on price pattern while other policies do not have 
significant effect.  Housing unit that was purchase within one month and another units that was 
sold 12 months later, the price could increase 0.0324% after policy in 2007 and could further 
increase 0.0276% after policies in 2011. 
One may want to look at price per square meter dynamics over sales sequence visually.  
We control for building fixed effect, floor, area, year-month fixed effect and area planning 
specific year trend.  Our dynamic results have very strong and significant evidence for Seller’s 
Stamp Duty,66 we show the effect of policy in 2011 in Figure 3.  The figure shows that the price 
increases rapidly over sales sequence after policy.  It seems that more arbitrage opportunities 
exist along sequence if we do not take transaction cost into consideration. 
4.5.2 Robustness Checks 
                                            
66 Regression results are available upon request. 
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To show that the results presented above are robust, we perform several additional tests.  
For the probability of speculative purchase, we run regression without project fixed effect but 
with region or area specific year trend.  As we control for less variable, we find the policy 
dummies are more significant.  Result in Table B3 show that the probability of speculative trade 
decreases after Seller’s Stamp Duty was imposed.   
We then test the robustness of our price trend result.  In Table B4 we restrict our sample 
to projects with only one construction stage as large project may have two construction stages.  
As we can see from Table B4, when we restrict our sample to these units, we continue to find 
that as the transaction cost increases, the price over sales sequence increases more than the 
absence of sharp increase in transaction cost.  In Table B5 we enlarge sample by including house 
units that were purchased by speculators before the policies and then were sold after policies.  
The results are similar with that in Table 4.5 and it would suggest that speculators do not have 
strong bargaining power to push down the price when they purchase units or push up the price 
when they sell them.  Overall, our results are consistent across various specifications, suggesting 
that as transaction cost increase, short term speculators decrease dramatically, and price over 
sales sequence increases more. 
4.6  Mechanism 
REALIS transaction level data shows that 82.99% speculative purchases happen within 
12 months from the sale is launched, and 10.76%, 21.52%, 44.84%, 22.88% speculative units are 
then sold within 12 months, 12- 24 months, 24-36 months, and 36-48 months from the first sale 
within the same development.  To explain our result, we try to investigate the changes in housing 
price from demand and supply perspectives.  We analyse demand by confining sample to units 
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sold within 12 months, and investigate supply side by using housing units that are transacted 24-
36 months.67 
We start from the demand side to analyze our findings.  When speculators participate in 
the market, they purchase houses at the early stage of sales sequence, which could increase the 
demand at the beginning of sales sequence, so the price at the early stage of sales increases and 
thus the price trend will be flatter, holding the price at later stages unchanged.  Table 4.6 shows 
our analysis of demanding from speculators.  Column (1) - (3) shows that price at the early stage 
of sales decrease with less speculators purchasing in the market after Seller’s Stamp Duty in 
2011, after controlling for building fixed effect, area, floor, time fixed effect and region specific 
time trend.  To see whether speculators have market power to purchase units at lower price, we 
exclude units purchased by speculators in column (4) - (6), with same specification as in column 
(1)-(3). The result shows similar coefficient, which suggest that speculators does not have 
specific market power to affect individual housing unit they purchased.  
We then move to the supply side.  When speculators sell the units at the late stage of 
sales sequence, it increases supply at the late stage of sales increases and therefore the price trend 
become flatter, holding the price at early stages is unchanged.  Table 4.7 shows that the price at 
later stages of sales sequence increases after policy when speculative sale is less.  To see whether 
speculators push up price of units they hold, we exclude units sold by speculators in column (4) - 
(6), the magnitude of coefficient is the same and the T value is very closed to column (1)-(3).  
This implies that speculators do not have strong power to push up price when they sell housing 
units. 
4.7 Conclusions  
                                            
67 We also run regression for units transacted 12-24, and 36-48 months, but we do not find significant result. 
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We estimate the effect of transaction cost on trading volume and housing price pattern of 
properties before the construction is completed.  We find that price increases significantly along 
sales sequence without short-term speculators after policies, which is mainly resulting from the 
decreased demand from speculators at the early stage of sales sequence and the decreased supply 
from speculators at later stages.  We also find that speculators in our study does not have 
significant market power to push down the price when they purchase the units or push up price 
when they sell their house units.  The more significantly upward trend over sales sequence within 
the same real estate development may suggest that price does not reflect the true value of houses 
from the perspective of market efficiency hypothesis. 
Our study has policy implications.  On the one hand, as housing price increases with 
more demand from speculators who step into market once the sale of new project is launched, 
the government may want to deter speculators, if they aim at the affordability of the majority.  
On the other hand, it is only when price does not reflect all information, speculators could get 
return by flipping house units, which suggest that speculators could transmit information into the 
price by their trading.  The government may want to relax this regulation from the perspective of 
market efficiency.  Actually, the government relax seller’s stamp duty on March 11, 2017 for 
some reason we do not know.68  Accordingly, sales of new private homes surged to a near four-
year high, which might provide evidence to support our finding. 69 
                                            
68 Home owners now only have to wait three years before selling their properties to avoid paying the SSD, down 
from four years previously. This applies to residential properties bought on or after March 11, 2017. The SSD was 
also cut by four percentage points for each tier. As the construction takes about 3 years, this policy is expected to 
affect demand and speculative trading.  
https://www.iras.gov.sg/irashome/Other-Taxes/Stamp-Duty-for-Property/Working-out-your-Stamp-Duty/Selling-or-
Disposing-Property/Seller-s-Stamp-Duty--SSD--for-Residential-Property/ 
69 http://www.straitstimes.com/business/property/march-new-private-home-sales-jump-82-from-february-more-than-
double-from-year-ago 
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Figure 4.1a: Number of Transactions That Will Be Flipped Before Completion 
Notes: This figure presents property price index for non-landed residential properties, the number of transactions of uncompleted units, and the number of units that “are purchased and will be flipped 
by speculators before completion” at year-month level.  The prices in 1Q2009 are used as the base reference price of the total index.  I define transactions that “are purchased and will be flipped by 
speculators before completion” as follows.  For example, a unit A is transacted on January 15, 2006, April 15 2006 and January 15 2007 before completion date.  The transaction on January 15 and on 
April 15 2006 are defined as “are bought by speculators”.  Transaction on January 15 2007 is not considered as “are bought by speculators”. For unit B that is transacted only once before completion 
date, it is not considered as “are bought by speculators”, either.  I use “Apartment” and “Condo” and exclude “Executive Condo”.  Source: Real Estate Information System.  
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Figure 4.1b: Ratio of Transactions That Will Be Flipped Before Completion 
Notes: This figure presents property price index for non-landed residential properties and the ratio of units that “are purchased and will be flipped by speculators before completion” at year-month 
level.  The ratio is defined by dividing the number of units that “are purchased and will be flipped by speculators before completion” by the total number of transactions of uncompleted units.  The 
prices in 1Q2009 are used as the base reference price of the total index.  I define transactions that “are purchased and will be flipped by speculators before completion” as follows.  For example, a unit 
A is transacted on January 15, 2006, April 15 2006 and January 15 2007 before completion date.  The transaction on January 15 and on April 15 2006 are defined as “are bought by speculators”.  
Transaction on January 15 2007 is not considered as “are bought by speculators”. For unit B that is transacted only once before completion date, it is not considered as “are bought by speculators”, 
either.  I use “Apartment” and “Condo” and exclude “Executive Condo”.  Source: Real Estate Information System.  
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Figure 4.2a: Number of Transactions That Are Flipped Before Completion 
Notes: This figure presents property price index for non-landed residential properties, the number of transactions of uncompleted units, and the number of transactions that “are flipped by speculators” 
of uncompleted units at year-month level. The prices in 1Q2009 are used as the base reference price of the total index.  I define transactions that “are flipped by speculators” of uncompleted units as 
follows.  For example, a unit A is transacted on January 15, 2006, April 15 2006 and January 15 2007 before completion date.  The first transaction on January 15 2006 is not considered as “was sold 
by speculators”. Transaction on April 15 2006 and January 15 2007 are defined as “was flipped by speculators.   
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Figure 4.2b: Ratio of Transactions That Are Flipped Before Completion 
Notes: This figure presents property price index for non-landed residential properties and the ratio of transactions that “are flipped by speculators” over all transactions of uncompleted units at year-
month level.  The ratio is defined by dividing the number of units that “are flipped by speculators” by the total number of transactions of uncompleted units. The prices in 1Q2009 are used as the base 
reference price of the total index.  I define transactions that “are flipped by speculators” of uncompleted units as follows.  For example, a unit A is transacted on January 15, 2006, April 15 2006 and 
January 15 2007 before completion date.  The first transaction on January 15 2006 is not considered as “was sold by speculators”. Transaction on April 15 2006 and January 15 2007 are defined as 
“was flipped by speculators.   
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Figure 4.3: Estimated Price Dynamics Over Sales Sequence 
Notes: This figure presents entire path of coefficients  and  for the Seller’s Stamp Duty (SSD) in January 2011. Most coefficient are significant at 1% level. We use price per 
square meter as dependent variable, and control for building fixed effect, floor, area, year-month fixed effect, and planning area specific year trend.  Regression results are available upon request. 
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Area-adjusted Transaction Price1 111,160 12751.41 5410.34 3211 53816 
Speculative purchase  111,160 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Months from the first sale2 111,160 8.19 11.36 0 47 
After Policy in Dec 20063 111,160 0.83 0.38 0 1 
After Policy in Oct 20073 111,160 0.72 0.45 0 1 
After Policy in Sep 20093 111,160 0.61 0.49 0 1 
After Policy in Feb 20103 111,160 0.57 0.49 0 1 
After Policy in Aug 20103 111,160 0.51 0.50 0 1 
After Policy in Jan 20113 111,160 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Floor  111,160 11.99 8.65 -1 70 
Area 111,160 101.40 45.44 31 495 
Housing Price Index 111,160 122.83 22.70 79.5 148.9 
1 Area adjustment is achieved by dividing the unit transaction price by the corresponding floor area. 
2 It is months from the first transaction date of uncompleted unit in the same property project. 
3 Details of policies are stated in the paper. 
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Table 4.2: Probit Regressions – Units That Will be Flipped Before the Construction is Completed1 
 (z statistics are reported in parentheses using clustered standard errors at the planning area level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Probit coefficient  Marginal Effect Probit coefficient Marginal Effect 
Months from the first sale2 -0.0153*** -0.0021*** -0.0190* -0.0026* 
 (-3.74) (-3.77) (-1.65) (-1.65) 
Log of housing price index3 -1.0429*** -0.1404***   
 (-4.47) (-4.49)   
After policy in December 20063 -0.0349 -0.0047 -0.1144** -0.0158** 
 (-0.34) (-0.34) (-2.51) (-2.51) 
After policy in October 20073 -0.5825*** -0.0784*** -0.3000** -0.0416 
 (-8.92) (-8.97) (-1.99) (-1.99) 
After policy in September 20093 -0.0568 -0.0077 -0.0055 -0.0008 
 (-1.06) (-1.06) (-0.05) (-0.05) 
After policy in Feb 20103 -0.1991*** -0.0268*** -0.2187*** -0.0303*** 
 (-3.10) (-3.09) (-2.91) (-2.91) 
After policy in Aug 20103 -0.3546*** -0.0477*** -0.2949*** -0.0409 
 (-8.17) (-8.09) (-3.21) (-3.19) 
After policy in Jan 20113 -1.1334*** -0.1526*** -0.7467*** -0.1035*** 
 (-13.04) (-12.74) (-4.43) (-4.42) 
Floor -0.0002 0-.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 
 (-0.19) (-0.19) (-0.10) (-0.10) 
Area -0.0030*** -0.0004*** -0.0031*** -0.0004*** 
 (-8.19) (-8.21) (-7.93) (-7.95) 
Project Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Year × Quarter Fixed Effect   YES YES 
Observations 93,562 90,427 93,562 90,427 
1 We use projects whose first sale is from December 2001. 
2 It is months from the first transaction date of uncompleted unit in the same property project. 
3 Details of policies are stated in the paper. 
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Table 4.3: Regression Results – Policy in December 2006 and October 20071 
Dependent Variable: Log of Transaction Price Per Square Meter 
(t statistics are reported in parentheses Cluster Standard Errors at Project Level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Months from the first sale2 0.0079*** 0.0067*** 0.0072*** 0.0090*** 0.0076*** 0.0058*** 0.0061*** 0.0076*** 
 (4.47) (3.23) (3.58) (4.51) (4.69) (2.95) (3.11) (3.88) 
After policy in Dec 20063 -0.0313*    -0.0330*    
 (-1.79)    (-1.78)    
After policy in Oct 20073 -0.0141    -0.0115    
 (-0.54)    (-0.54)    
Months × After policy in Dec 20063 0.0030*** 0.0021*** 0.0020*** 0.0008 0.0029*** 0.0020** 0.0019*** 0.0008 
 (3.45) (2.91) (2.92) (1.07) (3.12) (2.59) (2.66) (1.06) 
Months × After policy in Oct 20073 0.0038*** 0.0037*** 0.0029*** 0.0024** 0.0031*** 0.0032*** 0.0027*** 0.0024** 
 (3.06) (3.37) (3.57) (2.57) (2.80) (3.21) (3.68) (2.56) 
Floor 0.0058*** 0.0058*** 0.0058*** 0.0057*** 0.0060*** 0.0060*** 0.0060*** 0.0059*** 
 (8.53) (8.67) (8.64) (8.09) (8.14) (8.21) (8.17) (7.58) 
Area -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
 (-3.28) (-3.26) (-3.26) (-3.12) (-3.85) (-3.83) (-3.82) (-3.76) 
Project Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES     
Building Fixed Effect     YES YES YES YES 
Year × Quarter Fixed Effect YES    YES    
Year × Month Fixed Effect  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year × Planning Region Fixed Effect   YES    YES  
Year × Planning Area Fixed Effect    YES    YES 
Observations 33,564 33,564 33,564 33,564 33,564 33,564 33,564 33,564 
R-squared 0.965 0.966 0.967 0.969 0.970 0.971 0.972 0.973 
1 We use projects whose first sale is from December 2001.  To isolate the effect of Cooling Measures from September 2009, I restrict to projects whose last sale before September 2009.  We further 
exclude units with transactions across policies in December 2006 and October 2007, respectively.  
2 It is months from the first transaction date of uncompleted unit in the same property project.  
3 Details of policies are stated in the paper.  
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Table 4.4: Regression Results – Cooling Measures from September 20091 
Dependent Variable: Log of Transaction Price Per Square Meter 
(t statistics are reported in parentheses Cluster Standard Errors at Project Level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Months from the first sale2 0.0032* 0.0034* 0.0027 0.0034** 0.0022 0.0024 0.0019 0.0023* 
 (1.66) (1.77) (1.53) (2.28) (1.42) (1.51) (1.26) (1.72) 
After policy in Sep 2009 0.0257*    0.0233*    
 (1.86)    (1.84)    
After policy in Feb 2010 0.0263**    0.0252**    
 (2.43)    (2.55)    
After policy in Aug 2010 0.0033    0.0119    
 (0.37)    (1.19)    
After policy in Jan 2011 -0.0208    -0.0109    
 (-1.05)    (-0.75)    
Months × After policy in Sep 2009 0.0004 0.0007 0.0011 0.0010 0.0007 0.0009 0.0010 0.0008 
 (0.39) (0.83) (1.30) (1.37) (0.73) (1.20) (1.32) (1.23) 
Months × After policy in Feb 2010 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
 (-0.29) (-0.25) (0.13) (0.08) (-0.30) (-0.22) (0.01) (0.22) 
Months × After policy in Aug 2010 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0008 
 (-0.73) (-0.29) (-0.42) (-0.64) (-1.54) (-1.23) (-1.08) (-1.59) 
Months × After policy in Jan 2011 0.0023*** 0.0024*** 0.0027*** 0.0022*** 0.0023*** 0.0024*** 0.0026*** 0.0023*** 
 (4.43) (5.19) (5.11) (4.79) (4.32) (5.02) (4.81) (5.09) 
Project Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES     
Building Fixed Effect     YES YES YES YES 
Year × Quarter Fixed Effect YES    YES    
Year × Month Fixed Effect  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year × Planning Region Fixed Effect   YES    YES  
Year × Planning Area Fixed Effect    YES    YES 
Observations 70,763 70,763 70,763 70,763 70,763 70,763 70,763 70,763 
R-squared 0.955 0.956 0.957 0.959 0.962 0.963 0.964 0.965 
We control for floor, area in all specifications.  
1 We use projects whose first sale after policy in October 2007 and further exclude units with transactions across each policy in 2009-2011.  
2 It is months from the first transaction date of uncompleted unit in the same property project.  
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 Table 4.5: Regression Results – Policy in 2006, 2007, 2009 and Sellers’ Stamp Duty1 
Dependent Variable: Log of Transaction Price Per Square Meter 
(t statistics are reported in parentheses Cluster Standard Errors at Project Level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Months from the first sale2 0.0004 0.0002 0.0027* 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0018 
 (0.19) (0.12) (1.78) (0.12) (-0.08) (1.25) 
Months × After policy in December 20063 0.0020*** 0.0020*** 0.0007 0.0019** 0.0018** 0.0007 
 (2.80) (2.91) (0.96) (2.40) (2.44) (0.88) 
Months × After policy in October 20073 0.0048*** 0.0036*** 0.0028*** 0.0038*** 0.0034*** 0.0027*** 
 (3.60) (4.31) (2.96) (3.13) (4.09) (2.85) 
Months × After policy in September 20093 -0.0006 0.0004 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0007 
 (-0.61) (0.45) (1.12) (-0.22) (0.26) (1.06) 
Months × After policy in Feb 20103 -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (-0.60) (0.09) (-0.27) (-0.48) (-0.28) (-0.27) 
Months × After policy in Aug 20103 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0017* -0.0013 -0.0010** 
 (-0.99) (-0.94) (-0.89) (-1.71) (-1.47) (-2.07) 
Months × After policy in Jan 20113 0.0031*** 0.0032*** 0.0023*** 0.0030*** 0.0032*** 0.0023*** 
 (4.52) (4.63) (4.74) (4.20) (4.32) (5.07) 
Floor 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0063*** 0.0063*** 0.0062*** 
 (18.54) (18.32) (17.24) (17.73) (17.53) (16.32) 
Area -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** 
 (-10.59) (-10.56) (-10.33) (-11.04) (-11.00) (-10.82) 
Project Fixed Effect YES YES YES    
Building Fixed Effect    YES YES YES 
Year × Month Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year × Planning Region Fixed Effect  YES   YES  
Year × Planning Area Fixed Effect   YES   YES 
Observations 95,830 95,830 95,830 95,830 95,830 95,830 
R-squared 0.965 0.966 0.968 0.971 0.971 0.973 
We do not present specifications with policy dummies and year × quarter fixed effect to save space.  The results are similar in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4.   
1 We use projects whose first sale is from December 2001 and further exclude units with transactions across each policy in this table. 
2 It is months from the first transaction date of uncompleted unit in the same property project. 
3 Details of policies are stated in the paper.  
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Table 4.6: Regression Results – Units that are transacted within 12 Months1 
Dependent Variable: Log of Transaction Price Per Square Meter 
(t statistics are reported in parentheses Cluster Standard Errors at Project Level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Months from the first sale2 0.0070** 0.0058** 0.0059** 0.0059** 0.0046* 0.0044* 
 (2.54) (2.15) (2.30) (2.19) (1.75) (1.76) 
Months × After policy in December 20063 -0.0006 0.0011 0.0032 -0.0006 0.0011 0.0039 
 (-0.33) (0.60) (1.35) (-0.33) (0.57) (1.46) 
Months × After policy in October 20073 0.0006 0.0000 -0.0036 0.0026 0.0020 -0.0018 
 (0.14) (0.00) (-0.90) (0.62) (0.48) (-0.46) 
Months × After policy in September 20093 0.0035* 0.0030 0.0031 0.0033* 0.0029 0.0030 
 (1.79) (1.55) (1.57) (1.69) (1.45) (1.48) 
Months × After policy in Feb 20103 -0.0041* -0.0032 -0.0014 -0.0043* -0.0034 -0.0016 
 (-1.76) (-1.49) (-0.66) (-1.86) (-1.59) (-0.77) 
Months × After policy in Aug 20103 -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0007 
 (-0.48) (-0.24) (-0.25) (-0.63) (-0.39) (-0.39) 
Months × After policy in Jan 20113 -0.0024 -0.0033** -0.0036** -0.0026 -0.0034** -0.0037** 
 (-1.42) (-2.37) (-2.05) (-1.50) (-2.45) (-2.12) 
Floor 0.0064*** 0.0064*** 0.0064*** 0.0065*** 0.0065*** 0.0064*** 
 (18.52) (18.43) (18.22) (20.16) (19.92) (19.50) 
Area -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** 
 (-10.28) (-10.27) (-10.23) (-11.65) (-11.65) (-11.63) 
Building Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year × Month Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year × Planning Region Fixed Effect  YES   YES  
Year × Planning Area Fixed Effect   YES   YES 
Include units purchased by speculators YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Observations 73,949 73,949 73,949 72,320 72,320 72,320 
R-squared 0.975 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.977 
1 We confine units that are transacted within 12 months once the sales are launched.  We use projects whose first sale is from December 2001 and further exclude units with transactions across each 
policy in this table. 
2 It is months from the first transaction date of uncompleted unit in the same property project. 
3 Details of policies are stated in the paper.  
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Table 4.7: Regression Results –  Units That are Transacted between 24 - 36 Month1 
Dependent Variable: Log of Transaction Price Per Square Meter 
(t statistics are reported in parentheses Cluster Standard Errors at Project Level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Months from the first sale2 0.0067* 0.0061* 0.0062* 0.0054* 0.0050 0.0048 
 (1.94) (1.82) (1.85) (1.66) (1.54) (1.48) 
Months × After policy in December 20063 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0000 
 (-0.35) (-0.10) (-0.29) (-0.46) (-0.14) (0.04) 
Months × After policy in October 20073 -0.0036 -0.0033 -0.0033 -0.0029 -0.0027 -0.0028 
 (-1.32) (-1.23) (-1.22) (-1.27) (-1.19) (-1.19) 
Months × After policy in September 20093 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.02) (0.31) (0.33) (0.18) 
Months × After policy in Feb 20103 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 
 (-1.48) (-1.51) (-1.52) (-1.41) (-1.45) (-1.46) 
Months × After policy in Aug 20103 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
 (0.22) (0.38) (0.22) (0.27) (0.42) (0.24) 
Months × After policy in Jan 20113 0.0015 0.0015 0.0023** 0.0015 0.0015 0.0023*** 
 (1.37) (1.36) (2.58) (1.39) (1.37) (2.65) 
Floor 0.0059*** 0.0059*** 0.0059*** 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 
 (12.22) (12.11) (11.99) (13.67) (13.52) (13.37) 
Area -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
 (-4.48) (-4.48) (-4.23) (-4.31) (-4.31) (-4.07) 
Building Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year × Month Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year × Planning Region Fixed Effect  YES   YES  
Year × Planning Area Fixed Effect   YES   YES 
Include units sold by speculators YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Observations 7,397 7,397 7,397 6,904 6,904 6,904 
R-squared 0.977 0.978 0.978 0.977 0.978 0.978 
1 We confine units that are transacted between 24 months and 36 months once the sales are launched.  We use projects whose first sale is from December 2001 and further exclude 
units with transactions across policies in this table. 
2 It is months from the first transaction date of uncompleted unit in the same property project. 
3 Details of policies are stated in the paper.  
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Appendix B 
Table B1: Government Policies Affecting the Property Sector (1998 to 2016) 
  
Time Policy Details 
Jun 19981 The Government allow property buyers to pay the Stamp Duty at a later date. For uncompleted 
properties, the due date is the date of Temporary Occupation Permit (TOP). For completed 
properties, the payment is due when the property sale is completed. 
Dec 20061 The Government withdraw the concession to defer Stamp Duty payment. As a transaction 
measure, buyers who accept the Option to Purchase or sign the Sale & Purchase Agreement 
between 15 December and 31 December 2006 will have up until 14 March 2007 to pay the Stamp 
Duty without any penalty. 
Oct 20072 Removal of the Deferred Payment Scheme (DPS).  
In Oct 1997, the Government allowed developers to offer to purchasers of uncompleted private 
properties the option to defer part of the progress payments due after the initial 20% down 
payment, to a later stage. In Nov 2001, the Government further allowed developers to defer up to 
half of the initial 20% down payment up to the issue of Temporary Occupation Permit or any time 
before that. 
Sep 20093 Removal of Interest Absorption Scheme (IAS) and Interest-Only Housing Loans (IOL). The IAS 
and IOL were introduced by developers. 
The IAS allows purchasers who, after paying the upfront down payment, to defer making any 
further installment payments until the units are completed, i.e. issued a Temporary Occupation 
Permit (TOP). Prior to TOP, the bank requires only interest payments to be made on the loan and 
these payments will be paid by the developer. 
The IOL is a housing loan whereby the borrower makes only interest payments on the loan for a 
period of time, with no repayments of the loan principal. For uncompleted properties, the interest-
only period could be from the inception of the IOL to TOP of the project. 
Feb 20104 Seller’s Stamp Duty (SSD) was introduced on residential properties that were bought on or after 
Feb 20, 2010 and sold within one year of purchase.  
Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio limit was lowered from 90% to 80%. 
Aug 20104 The holding period for Seller’s Stamp Duty (SSD) was increased to three years. For holding years 
up to one year, the full SSD rate (1% on first $180,000, 2% on next $180,000, and 3% on 
remainder) will be imposed. For holding years more than one year and up to two years, 2/3% of 
full SSD rate will be imposed. For holding years more than two years and up to three years, 1/3% 
of full SSD rate will be imposed. 
For borrowers with existing housing loan(s), their LTV ratio was lowered to 70% and the 
minimum cash-component down-payment was raised to 10% from 5%. 
Jan 20114 The holding period for Seller’s Stamp Duty (SSD) was increased to four years and SSD rate was 
increased to 16%, 12%, 8% and 4% for properties sold in the first, second, third, and fourth year, 
respectively.  
For borrowers with existing housing loan(s), their LTV ratio was lowered to 60%. 
Dec 20115 Additional Buyer’s Stamp Duty (ABSD) was imposed. 
Singapore citizens buying their third and subsequent residential property pay 3%, Singapore 
permanent residents buying their second and subsequent residential property pay 3%, and 
foreigners buying their first and subsequent residential property pay 10%. 
 Oct 20126 The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) restricts the maximum tenure of all new residential 
property loans to be 35 years. 
LTV limit was lowered to be 60% for a borrower with no outstanding residential property loan 
and 40% for a borrower with one or more outstanding residential property loans if the tenure 
exceeds 30 years or the loan period extends beyond the retirement age of 65 years. 
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Table B1: Government Policies Affecting the Property Sector (1998 to 2016) (Continue) 
Time Policy Details 
Jan 20135,7 Additional buyer's stamp duty(ABSD) rates was raised. 
Singapore citizens buying their second residential property pay 7% and those buying their third and 
subsequent residential property pay 10%, Singapore permanent residents buying their first 
residential property pay 5% and those buying their second and subsequent residential property pay 
10%, and foreigners buying their first and subsequent residential property pay 15%. 
LTV ratio was lowered from 60% to 50%, or from 40% to 30% for individuals obtaining a second 
housing loan if the loan tenure exceeds 30 years or the loan period extends beyond the borrower’s 
retirement age of 65. For individuals obtaining third or subsequent housing loans, the LTV limits 
will be lowered to 40% or 20% if the loan tenure exceeds 30 years or the loan period extends 
beyond the borrower’s retirement age of 65. 
The minimum cash down payment for individuals applying for a second or subsequent housing 
loan was raised from 10% to 25%. 
Jun 20138 The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) introduced a Total Debt Servicing Ratio (TDSR) 
framework. Financial Institutions (FIs) are required to compute the TDSR, or the percentage of 
total monthly debt obligations to gross monthly income, on a consistent basis when granting 
property loans. It seeks to ensure the effectiveness of the LTV limits. 
Aug 20139 New Singapore permanent residents (PRs) have to wait for 3 years before they are eligible to 
purchase resale HDB flats. 
Dec 201310 The Government implement three measures for Executive Condominium (EC), which is closer to 
public housing in terms of buying and selling restrictions. 
Cancellation fees for ECs will be reduced from 20% to 5% of the purchase price. Second-timer 
applicants who buy EC units directly from property developers have to pay a resale levy. The 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) cap the Mortgage Servicing Ratio (MSR) for housing 
loans for EC units bought directly from property developers at 30% of a borrower’s gross monthly 
income. 
1 Source: https://www.iras.gov.sg/irashome/News-and-Events/Newsroom/Media-Releases-and-Speeches/Media-
Releases/ 
2006/Withdrawal-of-1998-Off-Budget-Concession-on-Stamp-Duty-Deferment/. 
2 Source: https://www.ura.gov.sg/uol/media-room/news/2007/oct/pr07-120.aspx. 
3 Source: https://www.ura.gov.sg/uol/-/media/User%20Defined/URA%20Online/media-room/2009/sep/pr09-
63a1.pdf?la=en. 
4 Source: https://www.iras.gov.sg/irashome/Other-Taxes/Stamp-Duty-for-Property/Working-out-your-Stamp-Duty/ 
Selling-or-Disposing-Property/Seller-s-Stamp-Duty--SSD--for-Residential-Property/. 
5 Source: https://www.iras.gov.sg/IRASHome/Other-Taxes/Stamp-Duty-for-Property/Working-out-your-Stamp-Duty/ 
Buying-or-Acquiring-Property/What-is-the-Duty-that-I-Need-to-Pay-as-a-Buyer-or-Transferee-of-Residential-Property/ 
Additional-Buyer-s-Stamp-Duty--ABSD-/. 
6 Source: http://www.mas.gov.sg/news-and-publications/media-releases/2012/ 
mas-restricts-loan-tenure-for-residential-properties.aspx. 
7 Source: http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/resource/news_room/press_releases/2013/Annex%20II.pdf. 
8 Source: 
http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/MAS/Regulations%20and%20Financial%20Stability/Regulations%20Guidance%20and 
%20Licensing/Commercial%20Banks/Regulations%20Guidance%20and%20Licensing/Guidelines/ 
TDSR_Guidelines_Refin_10Feb14.pdf. 
9 Source: http://www.hdb.gov.sg/cs/Satellite?c=HDBArticle&cid=1383801213783& 
pagename=InfoWEB%2FHDBArticle%2FLetterKEOLayout. 
10 Source: http://app.mnd.gov.sg/Newsroom/News-Page/ID/856/year/2013/RA1/RA2/RA3?category=Press%20Release. 
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Table B2: Seller's Stamp Duty (SSD) for Residential Property1 
Calculation of COE Quota Premium1 
Date of Purchase Holding Period SSD Rate of Price 
Between 20 Feb 2010 and 29 Aug 2010 Up to 1 year 1% on first $180,000 
2% on next $180,000 
3% on remainder 
More than 1 year No SSD payable 
Between 30 Aug 2010 and 13 Jan 2011 Up to 1 year 1% on first $180,000 
2% on next $180,000 
3% on remainder 
More than 1 year and up to 2 years 0.67% on first $180,000 
1.33% on next $180,000 
2% on remainder 
More than 2 years and up to 3 years 0.33% on first $180,000 
0.67% on next $180,000 
1% on remainder 
More than 3 years No SSD payable  
On and after 14 Jan 2011 Up to 1 year 16% 
More than 1 year and up to 2 years 12% 
More than 2 years and up to 3 years    8%  
More than 3 years and up to 4 years  4% 
More than 4 years  No SSD payable 
1 Source: https://www.iras.gov.sg/irashome/Other-Taxes/Stamp-Duty-for-Property/Working-out-your-Stamp-Duty/Selling-or-
Disposing-Property/Seller-s-Stamp-Duty--SSD--for-Residential-Property/ 
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Table B3: Probit Regressions – Units that Will be Flipped – Area Specific Year Trend1 
 (z statistics are reported in parentheses using clustered standard errors at the planning area level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Months from the first sale2 -0.0225*** -0.0229*** -0.0231*** -0.0237*** 
 (-8.63) (-6.94) (-8.25) (-7.38) 
Log of housing price index3 -0.0153*** -0.0141***   
 (-3.45) (-3.44)   
After policy in December 20063 0.0195 -0.1338 -0.1054 -0.2730*** 
 (0.29) (-1.44) (-1.38) (-3.97) 
After policy in October 20073 -0.5336*** -0.5749*** -0.3313** -0.3837*** 
 (-5.94) (-5.99) (-2.35) (-2.62) 
After policy in September 20093 -0.0679 -0.1057 -0.1427** -0.1889*** 
 (-1.18) (-1.47) (-2.43) (-3.11) 
After policy in Feb 20103 -0.1448 -0.1733** -0.2955*** -0.2383*** 
 (-1.29) (-2.13) (-3.18) (-2.96) 
After policy in Aug 20103 -0.3980*** -0.4502*** -0.3876*** -0.3862*** 
 (-4.89) (-3.57) (-3.56) (-3.29) 
After policy in Jan 20113 -0.5464*** -0.6644*** -0.5759*** -0.6205*** 
 (-7.24) (-5.40) (-4.23) (-3.75) 
Floor 0.0087*** 0.0044*** 0.0075*** 0.0047*** 
 (4.46) (3.31) (4.76) (3.44) 
Area -0.0027*** -0.0026*** -0.0027*** -0.0027*** 
 (-4.65) (-4.74) (-5.06) (-4.90) 
Year × Quarter Fixed Effect   YES YES 
Year × Planning Region Fixed Effect YES  YES  
Year × Planning Area Fixed Effect  YES  YES 
Observations 106,023 91,351 99,576 87,557 
1 We use projects whose first sale is from December 2001. 
2 It is months from the first transaction date of uncompleted unit in the same property project. 
3 Policy details are in the paper 
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Table B4: Regression Results – Projects with Only One Construction Phase1 
Dependent Variable: Log of Transaction Price Per Square Meter 
(t statistics are reported in parentheses Cluster Standard Errors at Project Level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Months from the first sale2 0.0007 0.0007 0.0030* 0.0004 0.0001 0.0020 
 (0.38) (0.41) (1.95) (0.24) (0.08) (1.35) 
Months × After policy in December 20063 0.0020*** 0.0020*** 0.0007 0.0019** 0.0018** 0.0006 
 (2.84) (2.92) (0.93) (2.40) (2.43) (0.79) 
Months × After policy in October 20073 0.0041*** 0.0029*** 0.0024** 0.0035*** 0.0031*** 0.0026** 
 (2.79) (3.43) (2.49) (2.66) (3.49) (2.55) 
Months × After policy in September 20093 -0.0005 0.0004 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0007 
 (-0.52) (0.45) (1.11) (-0.15) (0.28) (1.07) 
Months × After policy in Feb 20103 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (-0.60) (0.05) (-0.29) (-0.47) (-0.29) (-0.28) 
Months × After policy in Aug 20103 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0017* -0.0013 -0.0010** 
 (-0.95) (-0.92) (-0.81) (-1.67) (-1.42) (-1.97) 
Months × After policy in Jan 20113 0.0031*** 0.0033*** 0.0023*** 0.0030*** 0.0032*** 0.0023*** 
 (4.52) (4.64) (4.72) (4.21) (4.32) (5.05) 
Floor 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0063*** 0.0063*** 0.0062*** 
 (18.41) (18.19) (17.18) (17.58) (17.37) (16.23) 
Area -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** 
 (-10.57) (-10.54) (-10.30) (-11.01) (-10.96) (-10.79) 
Project Fixed Effect YES YES YES    
Building Fixed Effect    YES YES YES 
Year × Month Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year × Planning Region Fixed Effect  YES   YES  
Year × Planning Area Fixed Effect   YES   YES 
Observations 95,318 95,318 95,318 95,318 95,318 95,318 
R-squared 0.966 0.967 0.968 0.971 0.972 0.973 
1 We use projects whose first sale is from December 2001.  I restrict sample to projects with only one construction phrase in this table.  I exclude units with transactions across each policy in this table. 
2 It is months from the first transaction date of uncompleted unit in the same property project. 
3 Policies are the same as in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. 
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Table B5: Regression Results – Include Units across Policies1 
Dependent Variable: Log of Transaction Price Per Square Meter 
(t statistics are reported in parentheses Cluster Standard Errors at Project Level) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Months from the first sale2 0.0019 0.0011 0.0033** 0.0014 0.0005 0.0025* 
 (1.10) (0.65) (2.41) (0.81) (0.31) (1.85) 
Months × After policy in December 20063 0.0034*** 0.0032*** 0.0012 0.0034*** 0.0031*** 0.0013 
 (3.78) (3.51) (1.45) (3.58) (3.33) (1.52) 
Months × After policy in October 20073 0.0020** 0.0022*** 0.0021*** 0.0017* 0.0020*** 0.0019*** 
 (2.02) (3.07) (2.82) (1.78) (3.05) (2.68) 
Months × After policy in September 20093 -0.0004 0.0005 0.0011** -0.0003 0.0005 0.0011*** 
 (-0.58) (0.80) (2.47) (-0.39) (0.73) (2.59) 
Months × After policy in Feb 20103 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0005 0.0003 0.0000 
 (0.42) (0.43) (-0.39) (0.83) (0.58) (0.06) 
Months × After policy in Aug 20103 -0.0015* -0.0014* -0.0012** -0.0019** -0.0016** -0.0016*** 
 (-1.79) (-1.81) (-2.16) (-2.24) (-2.10) (-3.02) 
Months × After policy in Jan 20113 0.0030*** 0.0032*** 0.0028*** 0.0028*** 0.0032*** 0.0028*** 
 (4.84) (5.68) (6.39) (4.72) (5.51) (6.80) 
Floor 0.0058*** 0.0058*** 0.0058*** 0.0059*** 0.0060*** 0.0059*** 
 (13.64) (13.53) (12.87) (12.90) (12.82) (12.25) 
Area -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** 
 (-9.75) (-9.72) (-9.55) (-9.46) (-9.43) (-9.30) 
Project Fixed Effect YES YES YES    
Building Fixed Effect    YES YES YES 
Year × Month Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year × Planning Region Fixed Effect  YES   YES  
Year × Planning Area Fixed Effect   YES   YES 
Observations 111,160 111,160 111,160 111,160 111,160 111,160 
R-squared 0.961 0.962 0.965 0.966 0.967 0.969 
1 We use projects whose first sale is from December 2001.  I include units with transactions across policies in this table. 
2 It is months from the first transaction date of uncompleted unit in the same property project. 
3 Policies are the same as in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. 
 
